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ABSTRACT 
VOTER TURNOUT OVERREPORTS:  
MEASUREMENT, MODELING AND DECEPTION 
 
MAY 2017 
IVELISSE CUEVAS-MOLINA, 
B.A. UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO RÍO PIEDRAS 
M.P.S., GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Brian F. Schaffner 
American politics scholarship has in great measure dedicated itself to the study of 
democratic participation in elections. Texts that are considered the cannon on electoral 
participation have extended our knowledge of the factors that increase/decrease turnout, 
however, this work has relied on self-reports of turnout in surveys. The use of self-
reported turnout is problematic because a non-trivial proportion of survey respondents 
say they went out to vote when they actually did not, meaning they overreport turnout. 
Overreports of voter turnout are false reports of participation in elections by nonvoters 
when responding to political surveys. 
Appropriately, scholars of voting behavior have dedicated a great deal of research 
to the study of this phenomenon by conducting vote validation studies. This work has 
engendered important questions about the study of overreporting and how it affects the 
study of voter turnout. There are four major questions in the literature which I address 
throughout the dissertation: 1) How accurate is vote validation?, 2) Do overreports bias 
statistical models of turnout?, 3) What is the correct way to measure and model 
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overreporting?, and 4) What is the cognitive mechanism through which overreports 
occur? 
The first chapter describes the phenomenon of voter turnout overreports in 
surveys and how they affect estimations of turnout in political polling, and derives a 
social desirability theory of overreporting from the vote validation literature. Chapter 2 
presents analysis of the persistence and prevalence of overreporting in the Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study of 2008 2010, 2012, and 2014. Also, a comprehensive look 
at the demographic, social and political characteristics of voters, nonvoters and over-
reporters using data from the 2014 and 2012 CCES. Chapter 3 constitutes the first 
original contribution to the study of overreporting by proposing a new way of modeling 
the likelihood of overreporting through multinomial logistic regression analysis. Most 
Importantly, in Chapter 4, I test the social desirability theory of overreporting, namely 
analysis of response latency data from the 2014 and 2012 CCES studies. Finally, the 
conclusion of this dissertation summarizes the main findings of previous chapters and 
presents analysis of the bias induced by overreports in statistical models of turnout. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
American politics scholarship has in great measure dedicated itself to the study of 
democratic participation in elections. Verba, Brady and Schlozman, in Voice and 
Equality (1995), gave us insights into the demographic characteristics that make an 
individual more likely to turn out to vote in conjunction with a theory that focuses on the 
social and material resources people need to participate. Rosenstone and Hansen (1995) 
found that strategic mobilization efforts on behalf of parties, candidates, activists and 
groups are central to getting people to go out to vote. And, Meredith Rolfe’s (2012) 
social theory of political participation illuminated the importance of social network 
influence on motivating individuals to turnout. These authors have extended our 
knowledge of the factors that increase and decrease voter turnout in American elections, 
however, their work has relied on self-reports of electoral participation in surveys. 
The use of self-reported turnout in political science is problematic because a non-
trivial proportion of survey respondents say they went out to vote when they actually did 
not, meaning they overreport turnout. Since the 1950’s survey researchers have found 
that respondents often make inaccurate reports about their voting behavior. These 
inaccurate reports have resulted in the overestimation of turnout in surveys, where the 
rate of participation measured by public opinion polls far exceeds that of official records. 
If we took survey respondents at their word we would have thought turnout in 2012 was 
73%, when the actual rate was just 58.6%.1 Appropriately, scholars of voting behavior 
                                                
1 Weighted percent of all respondents in the 2012 CCES who reported that they “definitely voted in the 
General Election”. McDonald, Michael. (2014). National General Election VEP Turnout Rates, 1789-
Present. The United States Elections Project. http://www.electproject.org/national-1789-present  
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have dedicated a great deal of research to the study of this phenomenon by conducting 
vote validation studies. Vote validation itself is the process of matching publicly 
available voter records to survey data. Survey researchers can match respondent’s public 
records to their questionnaire responses and verify whether a person’s claim to 
participation is accurate or not. Table 1.1 illustrates how the study of overreporting in 
political science has identified a wide ranging amount of overreporting in survey research 
across various interview methods and over many survey years. Discrepancies between 
self-reported turnout and turnout records found in research on overreporting have ranged 
from 7% to 23% (See Table 1.1), showing that reporting participation in lieu of non 
participation is a significant occurrence in surveys. For over half a century survey 
research in the United States has missed the mark when estimating participation in 
elections, and the consistent finding of overreporting in surveys means that everything we 
think we know about why people go out to vote might be incorrect. 
Overreports of voter turnout are false reports of participation in elections by 
nonvoters when responding to political surveys. These false reports of turnout are 
problematic for American politics scholarship because political scientists 
overwhelmingly use surveys to measure the quantity, quality and equality of participation 
in politics (Rosentsone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Brady & Schlozman, 1995; Dawson, 
1995; Desipio, 1998; Leighley, 2001). If one of the main goals of this sub-discipline is to 
identify the factors that stimulate or depress engagement in democratic politics, its 
mission is complicated by the use of survey data that is contaminated with overreports. 
Statistical models of electoral participation based on self-reported turnout will almost 
certainly be inaccurate because overreports of turnout would bias the resulting 
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estimations. For example, a factor that has a statistically significant effect on increasing a 
person’s likelihood of voting in a model based on self-reported turnout might have the 
opposite effect or no effect in a model based on validated vote. Thus, overreports obstruct 
the accuracy of the scientific study of participation, which is arguably the most important 
activity in representative democracy. 
Table 1.1 Overreports in National Surveys by Mode of Administration 
Authors (year) Survey Mode Election Year Overreports as Reported 
Parry & Crossley (1950) 
Face-to-face 1948 13% 
Katosh & Traugott 
(1981) 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
1976 
1978 
11% 
12% 
Sigelman (1992) Face-to-face 1978 12.8% 
Burden (2000) Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
1970-1980 
1972-1984 10-12% 17.7-20.3% 
Belli, Traugott, 
Beckman (2001) 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
1964 
1978 
1980 
1984 
1986 
1988 
1990 
14.2% 
12.8% 
10.7% 
9.0% 
8.1% 
10.1% 
7.8% 
Bernstein et al. (2001) Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face & 
Telephone 
Face-to-face & 
Telephone 
1972 
1976 
1980 
1984 
1988 
1992 
 
1996 
 
18% 
19% 
18% 
21% 
20% 
20% 
 
23% 
 
Berent, Krosnick, Lupia 
(2011) Telephone 2008-2009 Panel 12.7% 
Ansolabehere & Hersh 
(2012) 
Telephone 
Telephone 
Telephone 
Online 
1980 
1984 
1988 
2008 
9.4% 
9.9% 
9.9% 
15.8% 
Table shows the survey mode, election year, and rate of overreporting found in a selection of vote 
validation studies.  
  4 
Voter Turnout Overreports in Survey Research 
The initial drive towards the verification of self-reports of turnout in surveys 
started with the 1949 Denver Validity Study (Parry and Crossley, 1950). Using both 
aggregate and individual level data sources the authors recorded what they called 
“invalidity,” finding that a startling number of “respondents exaggerated their 
participation in elections” (p. 72). Many other scholars have followed suit by exploring 
which factors are most related to overreporting, including individual level characteristics, 
political attitudes, and electoral context. Table 1.2 lists seven factors the most commonly 
predict the likelihood of engaging in overreporting in twelve vote validation studies. 
Findings show that high education is a significant predictor of overreporting in nine 
studies, followed by partisan strength and interest in politics. Beliefs in political efficacy, 
racial identity, age and income are also important factors that results in and increased 
incidence of overreporting among others not listed. In addition to those listed high 
salience elections have resulted in higher rates of overreporting in surveys (Karp & 
Brockington, 2005; Górecki, 2011). 
This work has engendered important questions about the study of overreporting 
itself and how overreporting affects the study voter turnout. I have identified four major 
debates in the literature: 1) How accurate is vote validation?, 2) Do overreports of voter 
turnout bias statistical models of turnout?, 3) What is the correct way to measure and 
model overreporting?, and 4) What is the cognitive mechanism through which 
overreports occur? I will address each of these debates in this dissertation by either 
discussing existing evidence or presenting my own research to answer these questions. 
The main goal of my dissertation is to make original contributions to the third and fourth 
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debates, namely how to best measure and model overreporting and what is the cognitive 
mechanism involved in overreporting. 
Table 1.2 Factors Predicting Turnout Overreports in Past Research 
 Education Strong Partisanship 
Political 
Interest 
Political 
Efficacy Race Age Income 
Abramson & 
Clagget, 1984, 
1986, 1991 
✓    ✓   
Anderson & 
Sliver, 1986 ✓       
Anderson, Silver, 
Abramson, 1988 ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓   
Ansolabehere & 
Hersh,  2012 ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Ansolabehere & 
Hersh, 2010 ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Belli, Traugott, 
Beckman 2001 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Bernstien, Chadha, 
& Montjoy, 2001 ✓ ✓      
Granberg & 
Holmberg, 1991  ✓ ✓     
Presser & 
Traugott, 1992 ✓   ✓    
Silver, Anderson 
& Abramson,1986 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓    
Stoké & Stark 
2007  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Traugott & Katosh 
1979    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Total 9 7 7 6 5 5 3 
Table shows the characteristics most associated with overreporting in a selection of vote validation 
studies.  
 
The debate about the accuracy of vote validation is continually revived in political 
science. Initial inquiries into possible problems with vote validation and the measurement 
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of overreporting stemmed from the consistent finding that Black Americans overreport 
more than whites (Anderson & Silver,1986; Abramson & Claggett, 1992). Most recently, 
Berent, Krosnick and Lupia (2016) tested the accuracy of vote validation using 
government records and computer based matching through an algorithm. They argue that 
the turnout rates resulting from vote validation only give the illusion of more accuracy 
and that we should trust turnout self-reports more than validated turnout. Furthermore, 
they argue that vote validation conducted by and purchased from private voter file 
companies cannot be independently evaluated and are thus untrustworthy. 
However, the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) has relied on a 
private voter file vendor, Catalist, for validation for almost a decade. Using Catalist data, 
Ansolabehere and Hersh (2010) conducted a study of the quality of public record keeping 
finding low rates of missing information, a small amount of obsolete records and low 
incidence of discrepancies between the number of “voters recorded as voting and ballots 
counted” (p. 2). In their 2012 study, Ansolabehere and Hersh described how Catalist 
obtains their data, how they manage that data and provide a detailed description of the 
CCES’s “commercial validation procedure” or matching process. Moreover, their 
analysis of overreports of voter turnout found that public registration and turnout record 
keeping throughout the United States had little to do with the incidence of turnout 
overestimation in surveys. The authors attribute a small percentage of overreports to 
measurement error (4-6%) and suggest that the rest is caused by falsehoods reported by 
respondents. What’s more, they argue that:  
“If poor record-keeping was the main culprit, one would not expect to find 
consistent patterns across years and survey modes of the same kinds of 
people misreporting. Nor would one expect to find that only validated 
non-voters misreport.” (Ansolabehere & Hersh, 2012: p. 7). 
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In order to bolster confidence in Catalist matching of the CCES, its principal 
investigators, Stephen Ansolabehere and Brian Schaffner, purchased vote validation from 
a second private vendor in 2014. Of the total 56,200 respondents in the 2014 CCES 51% 
were matched to a record in both Catalist and the other voter file, while Catalist matched 
70% of respondents to a record. More importantly, Catalist and the other vendor agreed 
96% of time in their classification of voters and nonvoters of those who were matched by 
both companies. This evidence contradicts the claims made by Berent and colleagues that 
suggest that vote validation has a high rate of misclassification. Catalist has matched 
between 70 and 84% of CCES respondents from 2008 to 2014 using only matches with 
high confidence scores, while Berent et al. (2016) achieved an overall 43% match under 
their definition of strict standards. 
Understandably, some political scientists will resist conclusions that may bring 
the veracity of self-reports in surveys into question, because those conclusions will put 
their own past research into question. Berent, Krosnick and Lupia (2016, 2011) strongly 
disagree with claims that individuals are lying about their political behavior in surveys 
even though research in and outside of political science shows that individuals 
misrepresent (lie about) both their attitudes and behaviors when answering questionnaires 
(Tourangeau & Yan 2007). Proposing that survey respondents sometimes lie about their 
voting behavior is not a call to wipe the slate clean with respect to the accumulated 
knowledge However, the very nature of scientific inquiry requires the recognition of 
problems or flaws in past research in order to improve. In the case of voter turnout 
overreports, evidence of mistaken or intentional misrepresentation of a respondent’s 
voting behavior will hopefully lead to advances in survey methodology and knowledge 
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about participation. Additionally, consistent overestimation of turnout in survey research 
suggests that there is something happening during survey administration which results in 
overreports, not during vote validation. I will continue to address this debate throughout 
this dissertation. 
The second debate regarding the effects that overreports may have on statistical 
modeling of turnout is related to the first debate. Implicit in the opposition to vote 
validation of survey data is the argument that overreporting is inconsequential to 
conclusions made about what makes people turnout. Nonetheless, multiple validation 
studies have found that overreports do bias the coefficients in statistical models of turnout 
(Cassel 2003, 2004; Ansolabehere & Hersh, 2012). For example, Presser and Traugott 
(1992) carried out the first panel study on misreports of electoral participation using 
Michigan Election Panel data from 1972, 1974 and 1976. Their main finding contradicts 
the hypothesis set forth in The American Voter (Campbell et al, 1960), which states that 
those who misreport are previous habitual voters. It is habitual nonvoters who 
overreported turnout most often. More specifically, they were concerned with identifying 
those who lie about their electoral behavior in order to find the true factors leading to 
voter mobilization. With this goal in mind they compared a self-reported vote model to a 
validated vote model using four variables to predict participation 1) interest in public 
affairs, 2) political efficacy, 3) income, and 4) education while pooling data from all three 
waves of the panel study. They found that though all four variables were significant 
predictors for self-reported vote, only interest in public affairs and income were 
predictive of validated vote. These results reinforce the perspective that survey results 
based on self-reported turnout lead to inaccurate conclusions about democratic 
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participation in elections. Later in this dissertation I will present data to further support 
this conclusion by comparing regression models based on self-reported turnout to models 
based on validated turnout. 
The third debate, that surrounding the measurement of overreporting stems from 
consistent findings that show higher proportions of overreporting among Black survey 
respondents. Silver and Anderson (1986) sought to debunk the conclusion that Black 
Americans were more likely to overreport by providing a detailed study of what they 
considered is the proper methodology to measure the validity of self-reported vote. In 
replicating previous validation studies while using their measure of validity they found 
that the miss-measurement of overreports had led to erroneous conclusions about the 
relationship between race and overreporting. They suggest that the first step should be to 
identify the nonvoters within a survey in order to then calculate the proportion of 
nonvoters who falsely said they turned out to vote. In their view, only nonvoters can 
overreport thus this is the only group to be included in analysis of the tendency to 
overreport. Still, many other studies have measured overreporting as the proportion of 
nonvoters among those who reported turning out to vote. Neither approach is inaccurate 
in measuring the proportion overreporting, but have important consequences for 
statistical modeling. The first approach results in a model that predicts the likelihood of 
overreporting given that a respondent is already a nonvoter. The second results in a 
model that predicts the likelihood that a turnout report is false, an overreport, given a 
respondent reported turnout. Both approaches fail to account for respondents’ probability 
of turning out to vote as a factor that then affects the probability of overreporting. I will 
  10 
address measurement and modeling of overreporting in Chapters 2 and 3 to illustrate the 
extent to which there are commonalities between over-reporters and voters or nonvoters. 
Finally, the fourth debate involves identifying the cognitive mechanism through 
which voter turnout overreports occur. This debate requires theory building and is what 
ultimately animates the research presented in this dissertation. Some scholars suggest that 
overreports are the result of memory failure and that survey respondents easily forget 
whether they voted or not (Abelson, Loftus & Greenwald, 1992; Stocké & Stark, 2007).2 
In that same vein, a group of scholars led by Robert Belli have examined the effect 
elapsed time between an electoral event and a survey interview on memory of 
participation. Belli and colleagues find that both memory and social desirability bias are 
at play in the occurrence of overreports (Belli et al., 1999; Belli et al., 2001, Belli et al., 
2006). Having said that, overreporting is most frequently attributed to socially desirable 
responding. I discuss the relationship between overreporting and this form of response 
bias in the sections that follow. 
The Social Desirability Assumption 
In spite of the many and varied advances in the study of overreports little is 
known about the cognitive mechanism through which respondents engage in 
overreporting. Most vote validation scholars attribute overreports of voter turnout to 
social desirability bias. Parry and Crossley (1950) suggested that “social pressures” (p. 
70) were to blame for the phenomenon. Silver and Anderson (1986) claim that 
respondents overreport because “voting is a socially desirable behavior” (p. 775). Katosh 
and Traugott (1981) argue that “a variety of social psychological pressures [are] known 
                                                
2 A few articles have focused on underreports of voter turnout, which argue that these rarely occurring 
reports are causes by memory failure (Adamany & Du Bois, 1974; Adamany & Shelley, 1980). 
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to result in systematic overreports of eligibility and participation” (p. 519) in elections. 
Karp and Brockington (2005) also assert that respondents “have a strong incentive to 
offer a socially desirable response” (p. 825) with regards to their voting behavior. Still, 
very few have engaged in research to directly test this assumption. 
Some researchers have set out to develop ways to diminish the occurrence of 
turnout overreports by creating new question wording mainly based on the assumption 
that overreports are the result of socially desirable responding. Presser (1990) failed to 
reduce overreports with the use of two preemptive questions, the first treatment asking if 
the respondent knew where their polling place is located and the second treatment asking 
about past voting behavior. Both treatments bring factual information to the forefront of 
peoples’ mind before answering the vote self-report question. Belli et al. (1999) designed 
an experimental question that addresses both memory failure and social desirability bias 
by providing “face-saving response options” that could “mitigate the need to claim 
having voted because of social desirability concerns” (p. 92). They found that the 
experimental condition significantly reduced overreporting the more time had passed 
since the election. Belli, Moore and Van Hoewyk (2006) emulate this study by 
conducting a new survey experiment where they test three vote reporting questions over a 
three-month period. They also find that questions providing face-saving response options 
reduce self-reports of turnout supporting the notion that overreports are caused by 
socially desirable responding. Yet another study builds on the use of face-saving response 
alternatives for the vote self-report question while eliminating the previously used 
lengthy preambles to the question finding positive results in the reduction of overreports 
(Duff et al., 200). Hanmer, Banks and White (2014), using Catalist validation, find that a 
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“bogus pipeline” treatment question has greater effects in reducing overreports and 
increasing vote report accuracy than the subtle treatments used by the authors mentioned 
above. The approach makes respondents aware that voting is a matter of public record 
and that survey researchers have the ability to verify their response to the vote self-report 
question. 
The problem with these attempts to reduce overreporting, successful or not, is that 
they sought to treat the disease without having a clear diagnosis. Belli et al. (1999) 
reduced reported turnout by 8.9% when comparing the total reported turnout in their 
control group versus their experimental group. Belli, Moore and Van Hoewyk (2006) 
reduce overreports by 4.6%, while Duff et al. reduce them by 8%, and Hanmer, Banks 
and White (2014) do so by 7.6%. These are good innovations in the measurement of self-
reported vote, but they come nowhere near fully eliminating the problem of 
overreporting. Though these scholars and I agree that socially desirable responding is the 
likely cause of false reports of turnout, survey methodologists should base the creation of 
new questionnaire items on research that identifies the mechanism through which 
overreporting occurs. 
Two sets of authors have gone beyond speculation about SDR being responsible 
for overreports by testing this assumption directly (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010; Comsa 
& Postelnicu; 2012). The item count technique (ICT) or list experiment is one of many 
techniques developed to reduce and detect SDR in relation to sensitive questionnaire 
items. It is designed to allow individuals to anonymously report attitudes and behaviors 
that may or may not be in line with social norms. Respondents are split into an 
experimental and a control group, and then are “asked to report the number of items on 
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list that fit a particular criterion” (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010: p.44). The criterion in this 
case is the respondent’s behavior, thus respondents in the control and the experimental 
group are asked to state how many of the behaviors listed are true for them. The control 
groups in these studies were given, in most cases, lists of four (4) behaviors and were 
asked to report how many of them were indicative of their own behavior. The 
experimental groups were given the same list of behaviors with the addition of an item 
stating the action of turning out to vote in an election, for example: “Voted in the 
Presidential election held on November 7, 2000” (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010: p. 47). 
The mean number of behaviors reported in the control condition is subtracted from the 
mean number of behaviors reported in the experimental condition resulting in “the 
proportion of people given the longer list who said they performed the added behavior” 
(Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010: p. 44). 
Judging whether the ICT was successful or not is simple. The respondents in the 
control group are given a traditional vote report question, which will likely result in an 
overestimation of turnout. Comparison of the proportion of reported vote from the ICT is 
compared to that from the control group. If the proportion of reported turnout from the 
ICT is lower than that resulting from a traditional vote report question one can infer that 
SDR with regard to the turnout question has been reduced. The ICT successfully reduced 
reports of turnout in face-to-face interviews and Random Digit Dial (RDD) telephone 
surveys, but not in online surveys. Holbrook and Krosnick (2010) applied the ICT to 
multiple survey modes finding mixed results. In their RDD telephone survey they 
reduced reports of turnout by 19%, their subsequent online surveys were less successful 
with no reduction in their first online survey, a 1.4% reduction in the second, and a 3.1% 
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in final one. Comsa and Postelnicu (2012) reduced reports of turnout in their face-to-face 
survey by 10.5%. However, the ICT technique is not without faults because it can fail at 
its main purpose of providing concealed reporting of undesirable behavior like non voting 
as explained by the following quote: 
“ICT can produce a ceiling and floor effect because of the limited number 
of statements that are used, and implicitly it is possible for the interview to 
identify the items selected by respondents when they indicate the 
minimum or the maximum number of statements” (Comsa and Postelnicu, 
2012: p. 3). 
 
The ICT is also limited because it can only provide aggregate values, but cannot identify 
individuals who voted or not. Consequently, the ICT can measure the overreport rate 
among the experimental group, but cannot identify exactly who engaged in overreporting. 
Together the creation of new question wording and the application of the ICT to 
self-reports of turnout provide somewhat supporting evidence for the widely held 
assumption that voter turnout overreports are the result of SDR. Regrettably, these forays 
into the study of overreporting in connection to SDR reveal almost nothing about the 
mechanism or mental process that respondents who are nonvoters engage in when they 
falsely report participating in elections. Though it is valuable to find supporting evidence 
for the role of SDR in overreporting but the accomplishments of these studies are equal to 
those of the studies that identified the central correlates of overreporting, because neither 
identify the mechanism of overreporting. Once the mechanism is identified researchers 
may be able develop more effective ways of extracting more accurate self-reports. 
Socially Desirable Responding: A Complex Construct 
Socially desirable responding (SDR) is one of many forms of response bias in 
surveys. Response biases in general result in a “systematic tendency to answer 
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questionnaire items on some basis that interferes with accurate self-reports” (Paulhus, 
2002: p. 49), but SDR specifically produces a “tendency to give overly positive self-
descriptions” (p. 50). Holtgraves (2004) gives a more descriptive definition saying; 
“Social desirability refers to a tendency to respond to self-report items in a manner that 
makes the respondents look good rather than to respond in an accurate and truthful 
manner” (p. 161). Tourangeau and Yan (2007) hold that socially desirable responding 
occurs when individuals are asked questions about sensitive topics like voting. Sensitive 
questions can elicit answers that are socially undesirable or reveal that individuals have 
not complied with social norms, like the democratic norm of voting. Consequently, 
respondents might engage in socially desirable responding to make themselves look good 
to others or to themselves. 
Socially desirable responding has been found to manifest itself in more than one 
way, meaning all deceptive responses are not created equal. Though many 
operationalizations and typologies of SDR have been developed (Damarin & Messick, 
1965; Sackheim & Gur, 1979), a two factor typology of impression management and 
self-deception has been most commonly used by social psychologists to theorize and 
measure SDR. Impression management (IM) is “the tendency to give favorable self-
descriptions to others” and self-deception (SD) is “the tendency to give favorably biased 
but honestly held self-descriptions” (Paulhus & Reid, 1991). In 1984 Paulhus developed 
the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) to assess individual differences 
in SDR which includes an Impression Management Scale and a Self-Deception Scale 
which were built on previous work that has focused on “distinguishing self-deception, 
where the respondent actually believes his or his positive self-reports, from impression 
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management, where the respondent consciously dissembles” (p.599). Furthermore, 
Paulhus and John (1998) explain that self-deception correspondents to egoistic bias, 
which reveals an “exaggerated self-worth with regard to social and intellectual status” 
(Paulhus & John, 1998; p. 1041); while impression management corresponds to 
moralistic bias, which reveals an “exaggerated self-positivity of being a good person or a 
good citizen” (p. 1046). 
Clearly, awareness of engaging in SDR, on behalf of the respondent, is central to 
distinguishing between self-deception and impression management style SDR. Paulhus 
(2002) uses the words “deliberate exaggeration” and “deliberate minimization” to 
describe impression management. In his early work he was resistant to attributing 
intentionality to impression management, but now has come to conclude that impression 
management is characteristically conscious. Other authors have all spoken to the 
intentionality of impression management. Holtgraves (2004) describes SDR’s two factor 
typology affirming that “impression management, refers to a tendency to purposely tailor 
one’s answers to create a positive social image; it is other-deception… The other factor, 
termed self-deception, refers to an honest but overly positive self-presentation…”  (p 
161). Further stating that “impression management (conscious, deliberate, deception of 
others) and self-deception (nonconscious deception of one-self) “(p. 163). Li and Bagger 
(2007) explain that “[s]elf-deception is an unintentional propensity to portray oneself in a 
favorable light, manifested in positively biased but honestly believed self-descriptions… 
Impression management, in contrast, indicates a tendency to intentionally distort one’s 
self-image to be perceived favorably by others” (p. 526-527).  
 
  17 
A Social Desirability Theory of Overreporting 
The widely held assumption that voter turnout overreports are caused by SDR has 
important implications for understanding this phenomenon in political survey research. 
The definitions and typologies of SDR reveal that there are complexities that validation 
scholars have not taken into account when studying overreporting or attempting to reduce 
its occurrence. The first implication of the SDR assumption is that if overreports are 
caused by SDR, then they themselves are deceptive answers to the vote self-report 
question because these responses provide false information about the respondents’ true 
behavior. This implication stems from knowing that the social psychology literature 
defines SDR as a response bias that results in deception because it produces 
false/deceptive reports of attitudes and behaviors in the process of responding to survey 
questionnaires. 
Validation scholars have been very careful not to say that overreports are in effect 
lies about going out to vote. Saying that respondents are lying or being deceptive can 
imply that a moral judgment is being made by the researcher on the respondent. Still, 
using the words deception, lie, or falsehood to describe overreports is entirely accurate. 
More importantly, understanding that SDR results in deception becomes an advantage in 
an academic perspective. It opens up a variety of possibilities with respect to the study of 
overreporting because psychologists have extensively studied human lying and deception. 
The existing literature on this phenomenon along with its theories and methodologies 
then becomes a new tool box for political science to make sense of overreporting. 
The second implication of the SDR assumption is that overreporting must be 
equivalent to one of the two main types of SDR; that is, overreporting must correspond to 
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either self-deception or impression management. The existing literature on SDR suggests 
that overreporting is equivalent to impression management because this type of SDR is 
induced by an exaggerated view of being a good citizen. If overreporting occurs due to 
impression management what occurs in the survey administration process is the 
following. Nonvoters responding to a post-election survey are given a vote self-report 
question, their memory of non-participation becomes available in their minds, but also 
thoughts about group and societal costs and benefits regarding the democratic norm of 
voting. Nonvoters then decide to falsely report participation in the election they were 
asked about in order to appear as if they conform to the democratic norm of voting. They 
decide to give a socially desirable response to make themselves look like good citizens. I 
qualify the considerations the nonvoters evaluate before overreporting as “group and 
societal costs and benefits” because moralistic bias is related to “affiliation, belonging, 
intimacy, love, connectedness, approval, and nurturance” (Steenkamp et al., 2010: p. 
200). 
The argument that overreporting is equivalent to impression management is 
further supported by Rolfe’s (2012) social theory of political participation. Central to her 
theory is the “social meaning meaning of voting,” where “voting is a fundamental act of 
the American citizen” (p. 43).  Rolfe explains that “[b]ecause the social meaning of 
voting is uncontested, a failure to vote may be excusable as an accident, but it cannot be 
justified without casting doubt on one’s good standing as an American citizen” (p. 43). 
More importantly, she finds the nonvoters also recognize the importance of voting and 
the communal nature of voting in American elections. As I mention before, self-
deception is motivated by the need to improve one’s self-image while impressions 
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management is about improving one’s social image. Consequently, falsely reporting 
turnout, overreporting, responds to the social meaning of voting which is align with the 
descriptions of what motivates impression management. 
Dissertation Overview 
This first chapter described the phenomenon of voter turnout overreports in 
survey research and how they have affected turnout estimations throughout the history of 
political polling. A summary of the political science literature on overreporting was 
presented by highlighting the four main debates surrounding voter turnout overreports: 
“1) How accurate is vote validation?, 2) Do overreports of voter turnout bias statistical 
models of turnout?, 3) What is the correct way to measure and model overreporting?, and 
4) What is the cognitive mechanism through which overreports occur?” While this 
dissertation engages these main debates, research in this dissertation seeks to make 
original contributions to the third and fourth debates. The first and second debates will be 
addressed throughout. 
Chapter 2 will present analysis of the the persistence and prevalence of 
overreporting in the CCES studies of 2008 2010, 2012, and 2014 (See Appendix A for 
filed dates and response rates). Also, a comprehensive look at the demographics, political 
attitudes and levels of political engagement of voters, nonvoters and over-reporters using 
data from the 2014 and 2012 CCES. Another debate among political scientists is derived 
from the first, second and third debates which are all related to measurement questions 
whether ‘over-reporters’ are more similar to voters or nonvoters. Comparing the 
descriptive statistics of all three types of respondents will provide a first chance of 
observing the level of accuracy in the vote validation process, it hints as to whether 
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overreporting affect predictive models of turnout, and provides the scaffolding for 
Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 constitutes the first original contribution to the study of overreporting 
by proposing a new way modeling the likelihood of overreporting through multinomial 
logistic regression analysis. The new approach proposed improves predictive models of 
overreporting by simultaneously estimating the probability of turning out to vote and that 
of overreporting. This is the proper methodology for examining the correlates of 
overreporting, and offers a more definitive view of the similarities and difference 
between voters and over-reporters. 
Most Importantly, I will test the assumption that overreporting is caused by 
socially desirable responding using new data and methods to do so in Chapter 4. Using 
response latency data from the 2014 and 2012 CCES studies I demonstrate that residents 
who overreport turning out to vote intentionally misrepresent their voting behavior. Using 
the CCES in testing this hypothesis constitutes a hard case for finding social desirability 
bias in self-reports of voter turnout because self-administered, computer based and online 
surveys have been found to increase reports of sensitive information (Kreuter et al, 2008).  
Finally, the conclusion of this dissertation will summarize the main findings of 
previous chapters, and present how overreports bias statistical models of turnout. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
WHO OVERREPORTS TURNOUT? 
Identifying overreports of turnout in surveys and the factors related to its 
occurrence is the first step in understanding this form of response bias. This task sheds 
light on the incidence of overreporting, its prevalence over time, and the characteristics of 
those who overreport in comparison to voters and nonvoters. Explaining the processes 
through which overreporting can be detected in survey research brings clarity to the 
debate regarding the accuracy of vote validation, and how to best measure overreporting. 
Also, finding differences between the dominant characteristics of over-reporters, voters 
and nonvoters is the first benchmark for concluding whether overreports affect predictive 
models of turnout. Showing whether over-reporters are more like voters or nonvoters 
contributes to settling this third debate. 
Overreports can be identified indirectly at the aggregate level and directly at 
individual level, depending on the resources available to researchers. Both modes of 
identifying of overreporting require the comparison of two sets of data 1) reported 
turnout in surveys and 2) publicly recorded or estimated turnout. In this chapter, I first 
present aggregate comparisons of self-reported turnout and recorded turnout to illustrate 
trends of turnout overestimation mainly in the Cooperative Congressional Election Study 
(CCES). Second, I focus on individual level measurement of overreporting in the CCES 
because it allows for precise estimation in descriptive inference, and in correlational 
analysis in later chapters. I compare validated voters, nonvoters and over-reporters on 
their demographic characteristics, political attitudes and levels of political engagement. 
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Together aggregate and individual level analysis of overreporting will answer the 
question “Who overreports?” 
Measuring Voter Turnout Overreports 
The comparison of aggregate survey and public data immediately reveals the 
discrepancy between the proportion of people who reported going out to vote with that 
recorded by governmental institutions tasked with administering elections. This is the 
simplest way to identify the occurrence of overreporting in surveys, but this discrepancy 
is best defined as overestimation of turnout. The comparison of aggregate data from 
disparate sources is possible because survey samples are, for the most part, the equivalent 
to a small snapshot of the population under study thanks to the development and use of 
representative sampling. Consequently, if the survey sample holds the same or very 
similar characteristics to the population being studied, like adult U.S. citizens eligible to 
vote, then the survey sample should have the same proportion of turnout than the 
population. However, this is rarely the case.  
Table 2.1. CCES Reported Turnout and United States Election Project VEP Turnout 
General Election Year USEP VEP Estimated Turnout 
CCES 
Reported Turnout Difference 
2014 36.7% 69.6% 32.9 
2012 58.6% 74.5% 15.9 
2010 41.8% 59.9% 18.1 
2008 62.2% 68.2% 6.0 
Rows compare two aggregate turnout estimations, the percent of United States Election Project 
estimated turnout based on Voting Eligible Population (VEP) and weighted percent of self-reported 
turnout in the CCES among all citizen respondents. 
 
Early validation studies identified the overestimation of turnout by comparing 
aggregate level data to document the discrepancy between turnout estimations in surveys 
and publicly recorded turnout (Clausen, 1968). To illustrate this method, I compare 
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reported turnout in four consecutive CCES surveys to turnout estimates from the United 
States Election Project3. The CCES is a biennial online large sample survey administered 
through YouGov since the year 2006, which includes a pre-election and post-election 
questionnaire. CCES samples since the year 2010 have exceeded 50,000 respondents. 
Quantities for reported turnout in the CCES are the result of the weighted proportion of 
citizen respondents who said they definitely voted in the 2014, 2012, 2010 and 2008 
CCES surveys, proportions are estimated from the full sample of respondents in the 
CCES subsequent estimates are derived from subsets. The United States Election Project 
(USEP) “is an information source for the United States electoral system” (McDonald, 
2016), it has sourced official state-by-state estimates for every election year since 2000 to 
determine national turnout levels based on the Voting Eligible Population (VEP).4 The 
VEP is the quantity of interest here because the calculating the turnout based on the 
voting age population (VAP)5 uses a denominator that is larger and skews the estimated 
rate of participation downward which then results in an inaccurate representation of 
turnout in the United States. To be sure, though the U.S. Census Bureau makes official 
estimates of national turnout those estimates are based on the Current Population Survey 
while the USEP data is not based on surveys. For this reason, the USEP data cannot be 
                                                
3 McDonald, Michael. (2017). “Home”, United States Elections Project. URL: http://www.electproject.org. 
Accessed January 23, 2017.  
4 “…voting-eligible population is constructed by adjusting the voting-age population for non-citizens and 
ineligible felons, depending on state law.” McDonald, Michael. (2017). “Voter Turnout: FAQ”, United 
States Election Project. URL: http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/faq/sold. Accessed: Jan. 23, 
2017. 
 
5 VAP turnout: 33.2% in 2014, 53.6% in 2012, 37.8% in 2010, and 56.9% in 2008. McDonald, Michael. 
(2017). “Voter Turnout Data,” United States Election Project.  URL: 
http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/voter-turnout-data. Accessed: March 7, 2017. 
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contaminated with response bias, like overreporting, and is treated here as an accurate 
assessment of national turnout in U.S. elections. 
Reported turnout in the CCES exceeds turnout estimations published by the 
USEP, especially in the year 2014 when turnout hit a historic low. Evidently, the CCES 
has not made accurate estimations of voter turnout in any of the years under analysis, 
having overestimated turnout by 6.0 to 32.9 percentage points (See Table 2.1). Yet, the 
American National Election Study overestimated turnout in the 2008 and 2012 
presidential elections by larger margins than the CCES when compared to the amounts 
calculated by the USEP, a difference of 15.8 percentage points in 2008 and 19.4 
percentage points in 2012.6  The discrepancy between reported turnout in the CCES and 
that estimated by the USEP is a strong indication that overreporting occurred in the 
administration of the CCES. Nevertheless, the discrepancy found between reported 
turnout and official estimates does not necessarily indicate the exact amount of 
overreporting that occurred among CCES respondents. This is especially true since the 
sampling method employed in the CCES is not probability sampling, but a sample 
matching methodology that results in large samples of over 50,000 respondents in each 
year of the study with the exception of the 2008 CCES, which has a sample of almost 
32,800 respondents (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014; 2012; 2010, Ansolabehere, 2008). 
Moreover, sample selection bias is assuredly a factor in the incidence of overreporting 
within all surveys that measure turnout because surveys are voluntary and most volunteer 
respondents are already likely to be politically engaged, which results in “inflated rates of 
participation” (Ansolabehere & Hersh, 2012). Thus, direct comparison of respondents’ 
                                                
6 The ANES estimates 78% turnout in both 2008 and 2012. 
http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab6a_2.htm Accessed: March 7, 2017.  
  25 
reports of turnout with their individual records of participation is the best method for 
identifying the incidence of overreporting within each survey year. Samples may report 
higher turnout that actual because of sample composition rather than because of 
overreporting. 
More precise aggregate and individual level identification of turnout overreports 
can be achieved with the use of vote validation, a main feature of CCES data. 
Respondents are matched to public records of registration and participation that show 
exactly who participated and who did not while revealing who overreported participation. 
Determining whether turnout self-reports in the CCES are accurate or not requires the use 
of nationwide state and county registration and voting records to measure the validity of 
these survey responses. For this reason, the CCES entered a partnership with Catalist 
LLC, a progressive political and marketing data vendor, which conducts the matching of 
respondents to their vote file. The CCES purchases vote validation from Catalist because 
there is no publicly administrated national level voter file. Private firms like Catalist have 
built a commercial business around compiling voter registration records that are then sold 
to political parties and interest groups for the purposes of political mobilization. 
Catalist voter registration and turnout records are of the highest quality 
(Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2012). Catalist purchases voter registration records from each 
state and county election administration office several times a year. It then cleans those 
records and makes them uniform, since the format varies from state to state and county to 
county. Their team compares old and new files to retain past records of individuals who 
have been dropped from new registration records. They also take note of missing and 
duplicate data; and whether individuals have moved or have died by crosschecking with 
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public records from the Post Office and the Social Security Administration. Most 
importantly, Catalist obtains commercial data from marketing firms and appends it to the 
voter file allowing them to fill-in possible missing data or data that is not requested 
during the voter registration process in some states. 
Table 2.2 CCES Respondents by Catalist Match Status 
CCES Survey Year Total Respondents Matched to Catalist Not Matched 
2014 56,200 100% 
39,415 
70% 
16,785 
30% 
2012 54,535 100% 
43,342 
80% 
11,193 
20% 
2010  55,405 100% 
42,916 
78% 
12,489 
22% 
2008 32,795 100% 
27,444 
84% 
5,351 
16% 
Rows present weighted total and percent of CCES respondents matched and not matched to the Catalist 
voter file. 
 
Validation is carried out in the Spring following the survey when YouGov shares 
the identifying information of every CCES respondent with Catalist. The firm sends the 
records of the respondents to YouGov, which then de-identifies the records and finally 
delivers their validated registration and participation to the CCES attached to the survey 
data. In the process of matching respondents to the voter file, Catalist favors precision 
over coverage in order to avoid false positives, meaning that if a match is ambiguous 
Catalist does not match the record at all. As a result, Catalist does not match every CCES 
respondent to a voter file record. However, a great majority are matched, between 70 to 
84 percent of CCES respondents have been matched by Catalist from 2008 to 2014. 
Lower proportions of respondents were matched to Catalist in midterm elections which 
also happen to have larger samples, 2010 with 22% not matched and 2014 with 30% not 
matched (See Table 2.2). The larger rate of unmatched respondents in the 2014 CCES has 
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been attributed by YouGov to an increase incomplete address information provided by 
respondents, which is necessary for the matching process.  
Berent, Krosnick and Lupia (2016, 2011) argue that vote validation data is flawed 
and that it does not provide a more faithful representation of survey respondents’ 
(non)participation in elections. In their 2016 study, the authors acknowledge that 
nationally representative surveys tend to overestimate turnout by wide margins and that 
this overestimation has led to interest in vote validation of turnout self-reports in surveys. 
Using registration and turnout records from six states (CA, FL, NY, NC, OH, and PA) 
they conduct a matching procedure for the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study. Using three 
matching algorithms with three levels of criteria to match respondents to government 
records (strict stringency, moderate stringency and least stringency). The more stringent 
algorithm resulted in the lowest number of matches, 46.5% of respondents from the six 
states under study were matched, while the least stringent algorithm resulted in the 
highest number of matches, 77.4% of respondents were matched in this algorithm. In 
their view the results from this study put into question the reliability of all vote validation 
matching procedures, even though they do not report any false matches in their study. 
Berent at al. (2016) say that self-reports of turnout are more trustworthy than vote 
validation data. First, because among those who are matched to a voter file record self-
reports are highly accurate, and this is taken as evidence that turnout overestimation 
cannot be the result of intentional lying. In line with their finding, CCES respondents 
who are matched to validation data have high rates of accuracy in their self-reports. I find 
that on average 90% of matched respondents between 2008 and 2014 accurately report 
their turnout or nonvoting. Still, on average 10% of matched respondents overreport in 
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the CCES (See Table B.1 in Appendix B). This rate of overreporting is cause for concern 
because these respondents can bias statistical models of turnout. The second and related 
reason is that they find that most vote validation scholars assume that non matched 
respondents are nonvoters. This is not the case in my research, I do not assume that non 
matched individuals are nonvoters, but assume that non matched respondents who say 
they did not vote are being honest about their nonparticipation. For example, in the 2014 
CCES only 9% of those who said they were not registered to vote were matched to an 
active voter registration record; they represent 0.01% of the whole 2014 CCES sample. 
To be clear, only respondents with a confirmed record of nonvoting who said they turned 
out to vote are classified as over-reporters or liars. Also, non matched respondents who 
report turning out to vote are excluded form this analysis because there is no way to 
confirm or refute their reports. Third, Berent and colleagues argue that the variation 
across states in record keeping and missing information in government records increases 
the rate of what they call “failure-to-match.” However, Catalist draws from multiple 
information sources in addition to government registration records to build a 
comprehensive record for every individual in their voter file. Consider for a moment the 
higher rate of non matches in the 2014 CCES. As I explain above, this occurred due to 
missing address information about respondents in the survey data not because of missing 
information in the Catalist voter file. 
It is Berent, Krosnick and Lupia’s view that “failure-to-match” gives an illusory 
sense of accuracy by lowering the rate of turnout in surveys and bringing it closer to 
official estimates, but that survey respondents are in and of themselves more likely to 
turnout out and we should expect higher rates of participation in survey samples. 
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However, Catalist vote validation of the CCES is quite successful, having a matching rate 
of over 70% in four consecutive studies, and turnout rates among matched respondents in 
the CCES are still far from official estimates. The description of the Catalist matching 
process provided above suggests that the data matched to the CCES is reliable, and here I 
treat it as such. What’s more, the CCES has verified the quality of the Catalist matching 
process by comparing it to vote validation purchased from a second voter file. Matching 
from the two different firms yielded highly consistent results, 96% agreement in 
matching to be exact, thus strengthening confidence in the vote validation data used in 
this dissertation. 
Table 2.3 CCES Respondents by Vote Validation Status and Reported Turnout 
CCES Survey 
Year Total Validated Voters Nonvoters Over-Reporters 
2014 40,713 26,648 66% 
10,296 
25% 
3,769 
9% 
2012 41,242 30,050 73% 
7,116 
17% 
4,077 
10% 
2010 46,118 25,439 56% 
16,803 
36% 
3,876 
8% 
2008 24,337 17,401 72% 
6,25 
17% 
2,916 
12% 
Columns show weighted total and percent by CCES year of validated nonvoters, nonvoters who 
honestly reported non-participation and validated nonvoters who overreported turnout. Percentages are 
rounded up to the nearest integer. 
 
Determining the rate of overreporting in each CCES involves important decisions 
about how to interpret the available data, which includes registration self-reports, turnout 
self-reports and vote validation data. I start by describing who are nonvoters, then 
proceed to identify over-reporters among them, and finally identify validated voters using 
Catalist validation data, all after restricting the data to those respondents who completed 
the post election wave of the CCES. The result is one variable with three values 
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measuring both actual and reported (non)participation in an election. I only conduct 
analysis of respondents who completed the post election wave because the focus of this 
research is on reports of turnout, which occur after the election. This process excludes a 
considerable number of respondents from the analysis here presented, on average 14% of 
all CCES respondents do not complete the post election questionnaire. Also, all 
unmatched respondents who reported turning out to vote are eliminated from this analysis 
because the validity of their turnout reports cannot be determined.7 These steps reduce the 
2014 CCES sample from 56,200 to 40,713 respondents, the 2012 sample from 55,353 to 
41,242, the 2010 sample from 55,405 to 46,118, and the 2008 sample from 32,795 to 
24,337 individuals (See Table 2.2 for total CCES respondents and Table 2.3 for subset 
totals). 
Defining who among CCES respondents are nonvoters involves three steps. First, 
all post election respondents who self-reported that they were not registered to vote are 
classified as nonvoters. These self-reported non-registered respondents are not asked the 
turnout self-report question; they are considered honest nonvoters because in all states but 
North Dakota registration is a requirement for participation in elections and unregistered 
people in North Dakota are still asked the self-reported vote question. Second, all 
respondents who reported that they did not go out to vote, not matter their match status, 
are classified as honest nonvoters. The vote self-report question asks respondents to 
identify the statement that best describes their behavior during the General Election of the 
                                                
7 Although unmatched respondents are likely to be nonvoters because lack of a voter file record can be 
interpreted as a sign that a respondent is not registered to vote. I do not classify unmatched respondents 
who report turnout as over-reporters because I cannot say with confidence that they are nonvoters, 
especially since the vote validation matching rate decreased markedly in the 2014 CCES when compared 
with other years (See Table 2.2).  
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year in which they are being interviewed. Five statements are presented; four describe 
nonvoting in the election in question and one final statement describes participation 
including the date of the election (See Image 2.1). I categorize all respondents who chose 
one of the four alternatives to report non-participation as nonvoters because the “social 
meaning of voting” (Rolfe, 2012) suggests that there is little incentive to report non-
participation. I assume that those who say the did not go out to vote for whatever reason 
are honest about being nonvoters. 8 Third, all matched respondents with no record of 
voting are also labeled nonvoters.  There are lower rates of reported non-participation in 
the studies that were administered during presidential election years, namely 2008 and 
2012. 
Image 2.1 CCES Vote Self-Report Question Wording  
Having determined who among all CCES post election respondents were 
nonvoters, I then identify those nonvoters who falsely reported turnout: over-reporters. I 
categorized matched respondents who said they “definitely voted”, but had no record of 
                                                
8 To be sure, this does not include validated voters who underreported their participation, meaning 
respondents who reported that they did not turn out to vote while having a validated record of voting.  
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voting as over-reporters. I only include matched respondents in this category because 
lack of a voter file record does not represent certainty that a respondent is not registered 
to vote. Results show that overreports in each CCES survey since 2008 constitute 
between 8 to 12% of respondents who answered the vote self-report question, excluding 
unmatched reported voters. This represents an average 10% rate of overreporting for 
these four consecutive CCES studies. The 2008 CCES has the highest incidence of 
overreporting with 12% of all post election respondents and 42% of all nonvoters falsely 
reporting participation. The lowest incidence of overreporting occurred in the 2010 CCES 
with only 8% of all post election respondents overreporting turnout, which represents a 
19% rate of overreporting among nonvoters in that year. Though overreports among 
respondents in the CCES post election wave occur at a relatively low rate the occurrence 
of overreporting among nonvoters is substantial, ranging from 19 to 42%.  
Validated voters  among CCES post election respondents are identified by using 
vote validation data and are labeled validated voters.9 A great majority of participants in 
the CCES are validated voters, between 56 and 73% of post election respondents. 
Historically presidential elections have higher levels of turnout which is reflected in the 
rate of validated voters in both the 2008 and 2012 CCES studies, 72% and 73% 
respectively. Turnout estimated from the above described subsets of CCES data is still 
larger than turnout among the U.S. population when compared with the VEP turnout 
estimates from the USEP.  
                                                
9 This does include validated voters who underreported their participation. Drawing on past research 
(Ansolabehere & Hersh, 2012) I assume that underreports of voter turnout are caused by human error— 
respondents clicked on the wrong answer.  
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Table 2.4 Validated Nonvoters by Self-Reported Turnout in the CCES 
CCES Survey Year Total Validated Nonvoters Honest Nonvoters Over-Reporters 
2014 14,065 10,296 73% 
3,769 
25% 
2012 11,192 7,116 64% 
4,077 
36% 
2010 20,679 16,803 81% 
3,876 
19% 
2008 6,936 4,019 58% 
2,916 
42% 
Columns show weighted total and percent of nonvoters among CCES matched respondents by self-
reported turnout to identify honest nonvoters and over-reporters. 
 
Over-Reporters: More like Voters or More like Nonvoters? 
This section gives a comprehensive look at the demographics, political attitudes 
and level of political engagement of validated voters, nonvoters and over-reporters in the 
2014 and 2012 CCES cross sectional surveys. These two studies provide a snap shot of 
self-reported and validated turnout in the most recent midterm and presidential elections. 
The purpose of presenting the characteristics of these groups side-by-side is to, first, 
identify the dominant characteristics of each group and, second, evaluate whether over-
reporters are more like voters or nonvoters. Past research would suggest that higher levels 
of education, income, and political interest along with strong partisanship will be shared 
characteristics among voters and over-reporters. Figures will show that over-reporters 
have similarities with both validated voters and nonvoters, but in various instances over-
reporters are distinct from these two groups. All statistics presented correspond to CCES 
post election respondents, excluding unmatched reported voters. Those referred to as 
‘voters’ are respondents with a confirmed record of voting (or validated voters). Those 
referred to as nonvoters are all respondents who reported they did not go out to vote. 
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Finally, over-reporters are respondents with no record of voting who reported they 
definitely went out to vote. 
Age, Gender, Race and Ethnicity 
Basic demographic characteristics like age, gender, race and ethnicity have been 
found influence an individual’s likelihood of participating in elections and multiple forms 
of political activity (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Brady & Schlozman, 1995). It 
is well known that voters tend to be older while nonvoters tend to be younger, this is also 
true for CCES validated voters and nonvoters.  CCES data includes year of birth of each 
respondent. Subtracting year of birth from the year of the survey creates a continuous 
variable for age that will allow to determine the mean age of voters, nonvoters and over-
reporters, the mean age for all post election respondents in the 2014 and 2012 CCES was 
50 years of age (See Table B.2 in Appendix B). The mean age of validated voters in the 
2014 CCES was 57 years of age, which is 21 years older than that of over-reporters with 
a mean age of 43, and 14 years older than that of nonvoters with a mean age of 36. The 
mean age of validated voters in the 2012 CCES was 53 years of age, which is 8 years 
older than that of over-reporters with a mean age of 45, and 11 years older than that of 
nonvoters with a mean age of 42. Overall, over-reporters in the CCES were closer in age 
to honest nonvoters than they were to validated voters. Furthermore, as previous literature 
on voting has established, voters were older than nonvoters including over-reporters (See 
Figures 2.1 & 2.2). 
Women make up 53% of all respondents in both the 2014 and 2012 CCES studies 
(See Appendix B). Women respondents in the CCES surpassed the electoral participation 
of men in both 2014 and 2012, where 51% of voters in 2014 and 53% of voters in 2012 
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were women. Also, these CCES studies show high rates of participation among women 
themselves, 62% of women voted in 2014 and 73% in 2012. While a majority of 
validated voters in the CCES were women an even greater proportion of nonvoters were 
women, 62% in 2014 and 54% in 2012. Over-reporters, on the other hand, have an almost 
even gender distribution in both CCES surveys with 51% in 2014 and 50% in 2012 being 
women (See Figures 2.1 and 2.2). This suggests that gender may not have significant 
relationship with the incidence of overreporting. 
Figure 2.1  
CCES 2014 Voters, Nonvoters and Over-Reporters by Age, Gender, Race & Ethnicity 
 
 
Now, I summarize the distribution of race and ethnicity of individuals in the full 
samples of the 2014 and 2012 CCES studies before presenting the proportion of Whites, 
Blacks and Hispanics among voters, nonvoters and over-reporters. CCES respondents 
Note: Bars represent weighted percent of CCES validated voters, honest nonvoters 
and over-reporters in the 2014 midterm election by age, gender, and race and ethnicity.  
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self-report their racial identity in the pre-election questionnaire having the opportunity to 
choose from multiple categories, including White, Black and Hispanic, even though this 
last category is an ethnolinguistic designation not a racial one. A total 11% and 9% of 
post election respondents self-identified as Black in the 2014 and 2012 CCES 
respectively, while Whites constituted a majority of respondents with 77% in 2014 and 
78% in 2012. Because some individuals may identify themselves by both their racial and 
ethnic identity an additional questionnaire item follows the race question asking about 
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish identity or heritage. I use this follow up question to 
complement those who directly reported being Hispanic in the race question to better 
identify all Hispanics in the CCES. Having added both groups, 9% and 8% of all post 
election respondents self-identified as Hispanic in 2014 and 2012 respectively (See 
Appendix B). 
The distribution of race among voters, nonvoters and over-reporters suggests that 
membership in different racial groups is associated with the rate of participation in 
elections and the likelihood of engaging in over-reporting among CCES respondents. 
Blacks made up a greater proportion of over-reporters in the CCES than voters and 
nonvoters. While 16% of over-reporters in 2014 were Black respondents, only 8% of 
voters and 13% nonvoters in that survey year were Black. In a similar pattern, 12% of 
over-reporters in the 2012 CCES identify as Black while 9% of all voters and 6% 
nonvoters also identified as Black. Over-reporters appear to be more similar to voters 
than nonvoters in 2014 and more similar to voters in 2012 (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Over-
reporting among Blacks was slightly higher in the 2014 midterm election, 16% 
overreported, than in the 2012, 13%. Fifty-three percent of Black post election 
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respondents in the CCES went out to vote in 2014, while 75% voted in the 2012 
presidential election. The higher rate of participation in the 2012 election among Black 
respondents could be attributed to co-racial mobilization caused by President Obama’s 
running for re-election. 
Figure 2.2  
CCES 2012 Voters, Nonvoters and Over-Reporters by Age, Gender, Race & Ethnicity 
 
 
Hispanics comprise a grater proportion of honest nonvoters than over-reporters 
and validated voters in the CCES. In 2014, 15% of nonvoters, 13% of over-reporters and 
only 6% of voters were Hispanic (See Figure 2.1). The 2012 CCES presents a similar 
distribution with self-identified Hispanics amounting to 11% of nonvoters, 10% of over-
reporters and 6% of voters (See Figure 2.2). Again, like with the comparison of the 
proportion of Black respondents, over-reporters were more similar to nonvoters than 
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Note: Bars represent weighted percent of CCES validated voters, honest nonvoters and 
over-reporters in the 2012 presidential election by age, gender, and race and ethnicity. 
  38 
voters with regard to this pan-ethnic category. Turnout among Hispanics was 
substantially lower than that of Black respondents in the CCES, by 9 and 14 percentage 
points, with 44% of Hispanics going out to vote in 2014 and 61% in 2012. However, the 
rate of overreporting among Hispanics was similar to that among Black respondents 
differing by only 3 and 2 percentage points, with 13% in 2014 and 10% in 2012 of 
Hispanics overreporting turnout. 
Because Whites constitute a majority of the respondents in the CCES they also 
constitute a majority of voters, nonvoters and over-reporters. Still, a noticeably larger 
proportion of validated voters were White when compared to the proportion of White 
respondents among nonvoters and over-reporters. Eighty-three percent and 80% of voters 
were White in the 2014 and 2012 CCES respectively, while 68% and 72% of honest 
nonvoters were White, and 69% and 75% of over-reporters. These statistics continue to 
show that over-reporters are more similar to nonvoters when it comes the distribution of 
race within those categories. The rate of overreporting among Whites was lower than that 
among Blacks and Hispanics in the CCES with 8% of Whites overreporting in 2014 and 
9% in 2012. This suggests that being part of these two underrepresented groups in the 
United States, Blacks and Hispanics, is associated with a respondent’s likelihood of 
overreporting turnout when answering political surveys. However, this does not mean 
that individuals from these groups are naturally more dishonest. My own past research 
shows that linked fate and shared identity with down ballot candidates could explain the 
higher incidence of overreporting among Black and Hispanic respondents.10 
                                                
10 In my paper “The Effect of Co-Ethnicity and Shared Race on Voter Turnout Overreports” presented at 
the 2015 Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting in New Orleans I showed how shared 
racial and ethnic identity between Latino and Black respondents and their congressional candidates was a 
significant predictor of overreporting. 
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Socioeconomic Status, Marital Status and Church Attendance 
Figure 2.3  
CCES 2014 Voters, Nonvoters and Over-Reporters by  
Socioeconomic Status, Marital Status and Church Attendance  
 
 
High levels of socioeconomic status in the form of education and income have 
been found to increase rates of participation in elections and political activity in general 
(Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Brady & Schlozman, 1995). Home ownership, 
marital status and religiosity have also been associated with varying levels of electoral 
turnout (Verba, Brady & Schlozman, 1995). However, income and education have been 
found to increase a nonvoter’s likelihood of overreporting (Abramson & Clagget, 1984, 
1986, 1991; Anderson & Sliver, 1986; Anderson, Silver, Abramson, 1988; Ansolabehere 
& Hersh, 2012). 
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  40 
CCES 2014 Voters, Nonvoters and Over-Reporters by  
Socioeconomic Status, Marital Status and Church Attendance 
 
The education questionnaire item in the CCES has six categories, four of which 
measure some form of college education attainment ranging from “some college” to “2 
years” to “4 years” to “Post-grad.” I combine these four categories into one that identifies 
all CCES respondents who have attended college or obtained a college degree. Thirty-
eight and 37% of CCES respondents have gone to college, in 2014 and 2012 respectively 
(See Appendix B). The CCES asks its respondents to report “family income” instead of 
individual income, meaning the full income in the respondents’ household. This survey 
item includes sixteen alternatives that represent a range of dollar amounts, for example 
the first alternative represents those with a family income of $10,000 or less and the 
sixteenth alternative represents those with $500,000 or more. Since this is not a 
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continuous variable I cannot identify the true average or true median family income of 
voters, nonvoters and over-reporters in the CCES. Still, I can identify the the median 
family income category for each of the three subgroups of interest in this analysis. 
I find that over-reporters are more similar to voters in their distribution of 
education attainment in 2014. Of course, a greater proportion of validated voters in both 
2014 and 2012 have attended college, meaning they have “some college” education or 
received undergraduate and postgraduate degrees. Forty-three percent of validated voters 
in the 2014 CCES attended college, and 41% in 2012. Nonvoters had the smallest 
proportion of respondents who have attended college, as is expected, with 23% in 2014 
and 22% in 2012. Over-reporters were closer to voters than nonvoters in the 2014 CCES 
with 35% having attended college, 8 percentage points less than voters and 12 more than 
nonvoters. Likewise, over-reporters in the 2012 CCES were more similar to validated 
voters. Over-reporters in 2012 differ from voters by only 5 percentage points, but differ 
from nonvoters by 14 percentage points in the proportion of respondents who have 
attended college (See Figures 2.3 and 2.4). This establishes a trend that suggests that 
higher levels of education attainment are related to an individual’s likelihood of 
overreporting turnout in addition to the likelihood of turning out to vote. 
I found distinct median income categories for over-reporters when in comparison 
with voters and nonvoters in both election studies under analysis. To be sure, family 
income is reported by respondents by choosing one alternative among a total of sixteen, 
alternatives represent a range of dollar amounts. Voters in both the 2014 and 2012 CCES 
surveys have higher family incomes than nonvoters and over-reporters having “$50,000 
to $59,999” as their median category. Nonvoters had “30,000 to $39,999” as their median 
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family income category, lower than that of voters and over-reporters. Finally, over-
reporters fell between voters and nonvoters with “40,000 to $49,999” as their median 
family income category, making them distinct from voters and nonvoters in this respect 
(See Figures 2.3 and 2.4). Cleary, higher levels of socioeconomic status are related to the 
likelihood of participation of CCES respondents, but also the likelihood overreporting 
given non-participation. 
Having described the distribution of demographics characteristics of education 
and income I go on to describe the type of household that is dominant among voters, 
nonvoters and over-reporters. I focus on home ownership, marital status and religiosity, 
particularly the percent of respondents who owned their home, were married, and 
attended church “once a week” and “more than once a week,” all factors that have been 
found to be related to high levels of participation in politics (Rosenstone & Hansen, 
1993; Verba, Brady & Schlozman, 1995). A majority of CCES post election respondents 
were homeowners with 65% in 2014 and 63% in 2012; most were also married, 54% in 
both 2014 and 2012. Still, 29% of CCES respondents in 2014 and 2012 report high 
church attendance (See Appendix B). However, there were very high rates of electoral 
participation among those in each of these categories. Seventy-four percent of 
homeowners, 71% of married respondents and 72% of respondents with high church 
attendance went out to vote in 2014. Somewhat higher rates of participation were found 
for 2012 CCES respondents in these categories; 79% of homeowners, 76% of married 
respondents and 73% of respondents with high church attendance. This increase of 
participation is to be expected in a presidential year election. 
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As the quantities above indicate, a larger proportion of voters should be 
homeowners, married and church goers. Seventy-three percent of voters in 2014 are 
homeowners and 68% in 2012. Over-reporters in 2014 and 2012 had the same proportion 
of homeowners among them (60%). Thus, the proportion of homeowners among over-
reporters in 2014 and 2012 is closer to that among voters. Married respondents make up 
58% of voters in 2014 and 57% of voters in 2012, while in both survey years 50% of 
over-reporters said they were married at the time, whereas 43% of nonvoters in 2014 and 
2012 were married. Over-reporters are practically equidistant to voters and nonvoters 
differing 8 and 7 percentage points in terms of marital status in both election years. 
Finally, the proportion of respondents who have high church attendance among over-
reporters differs with that among nonvoters by 7 and 5 percentage points in the 2014 and 
2012, respectively. Also, the rate of high church attendance among over-reporters differs 
from that among voters by 4 percentage points in 2014 and 7 percentage points in 2012. 
Church goers in 2014 make up 32% of voters, 21% of nonvoters and 28% of over-
reporters; and in 2012, they make up 32% of voters, 20% of nonvoters and 25% of over-
reporters (See Figures 2.3 and 2.4).  In this case, over-reporters are most similar to voters 
in 2014 and most similar to nonvoters in 2012 when it comes to church attendance.  
Political Attitudes and Engagement 
Partisan strength, campaign contact and political engagement can also affect an 
individual’s likelihood of participation in elections. More specifically, persons who have 
strong opinions in politics tend to care more about the outcomes of elections which can 
influence their political behavior and how they answer political surveys. Also, individuals 
who are contacted by candidates, political campaigns and/or organizations tend to be 
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more likely to participate in elections (Green, Gerber & Nickerson, 2003; Green & 
Gerber, 2015). Additionally, individuals who report high interest in politics, have high 
levels of political knowledge and already participate in politics are likely to be voters, 
because these characteristics indirectly measure political efficacy.11  
Figure 2.5  
CCES 2014 Voters, Nonvoters and Over-Reporters by  
Partisan Strength, Campaign Contact & Political Engagement 
 
 
The CCES measures the strength of partisan identification with a 7-point 
partisanship question where respondents can place themselves along a spectrum that goes 
from “strong Democrat” to “strong Republican.” Together those who identify with either 
                                                
11 “In their landmark study, The Voter Decides (Campbell et al., 1954:18) the concept is defined as: “the 
feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i. e., 
that it is worth while to perform one's civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is 
possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this” (Balch, 1974). 
Note: Bars represent weighted percent of CCES validated voters, honest nonvoters and 
over-reporters in the 2014 midterm election by campaign contact, high political interest, 
high political knowledge, and high political activity.
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one of these extremes are classified as strong partisans. In 2014, 12% of CCES post 
election respondents were strong partisans and 21% in the 2012 CCES (See Appendix B). 
Despite the smaller proportion among the respondents under analysis, rates of electoral 
participation among strong partisans were high in both 2014 and 2012, 82% and 79% 
respectively. More importantly, over-reporters appear to be more similar to voters with 
regard to strength of partisanship, differing from voters by only 3 percentage points in 
2014 and 1 percentage point in 2012. Fourteen percent of voters in 2014 and 23% of 
voters in 2014 were strong partisans, while 11% of over-reporters in the midterm election 
and 24% in the presidential election were also strong partisans. Nonvoters have the 
smallest proportion of strong partisans with 4% in 2014 and 12% in 2012 (See Figures 
2.5 and 2.6). 
I measure political engagement with four variables 1) campaign contact, 2) 
interest in politics, 3) an index of political knowledge, and 4) an index of political 
activity. Fifty-three percent of all respondents in the 2014 CCES were contacted by a 
candidate or campaign, and 63% in the 2012 CCES. Additionally, 53% of CCES 
respondents in 2014 reported having high interest in politics, and 51% in 2012 (See 
Appendix B). The political knowledge index measures how many correct identifications a 
respondent can make of the party of their members of Congress, the majority party of the 
House of Representatives and that of the Senate. I use the values of 5 and 6 correct 
answers together to identify respondents with high political knowledge. They made up 
46% of all CCES respondents in 2014 and 41% in 2012 (See Appendix B). The political 
activity index joins three questionnaire items from the CCES: 1) attending a local 
political meeting, 2) putting up a political sign and 3) working for a candidate or 
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campaign. This index provides a count of how many of these political activities a 
respondent has performed, 7% of all post election respondents in 2014 and 8% in 2012 
reported engaging in two or three (See Appendix B). 
Figure 2.6  
CCES 2012 Voters, Nonvoters and Over-Reporters by  
Partisan Strength, Campaign Contact & Political Engagement 
 
 
Those with high levels of political engagement had higher rates of electoral 
participation in both 2014 and 2012. Eighty-one percent of respondents who experienced 
contact by a political campaign went out to vote in 2014 and 83% in 2012. Eighty-one 
percent of those who reported high interest in politics turned out in 2014 and 84% in 
2012. Of those with high political knowledge 85% turned out in 2014 and 87% turned out 
in 2012. Those with high engagement in political activity had the highest rates of turnout 
with 84% in 2014 and 88% in 2012. 
Note: Bars represent weighted percent of CCES validated voters, honest nonvoters and 
over-reporters in the 2012 presidential election by high political knowledge, contact by a 
candidate or campaign and high political activity. 
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CCES respondents with high levels of political engagement tend to be more like 
voters than nonvoters overall. A greater proportion of voters reported having been 
contacted by political campaigns with 66% in 2014 and 72% in 2012. In this case, over-
reporters are closer to nonvoters in 2014 with regard to the proportion of respondents 
who were contacted by a campaign. Forty-three percent of over-reporters in 2014 were 
contacted and 25% of nonvoters, a difference of 18 percentage points. In 2012, over-
reporters were closer to voters than nonvoters. Fifty-six of over-reporters, 31% of 
nonvoters and as mentioned above 72% of over-reporters were contacted. With regard to 
high interest in politics over-reporters were closer to voters than nonvoters in both 2014 
and 2012. Over-reporters in 2014 had a proportion of 53% high political interest 
respondents and 50% in 2012, while the proportion of among voters was of 66% in 2014 
and 59% in 2012. A smaller proportion of nonvoters were respondents with high interest 
in politics with 22% both in 2014 and 20% in 2012.  
Greater similarity between over-reporters and voters continues with regard to 
political knowledge and political activity. A substantial proportion of CCES validated 
voters have high knowledge about politics, 61% in 0214 and 50% in 2012. Only 15% of 
nonvoters in 2012 and 12% in 2012 have high political knowledge. Over-reporters are 
distinct in 2014, but closer to voters in 2012. Thirty-eight percent of over-reporters in 
2014 and 35% in 2012 had high levels of political knowledge. Finally, small proportions 
of voters, nonvoters and over-reporters have engaged in high political activity. Only 9% 
of voters and 8% of over-reporters in 2014, and 10% of voters and 8% of over-reporters 
in 2012 engaged in high political activity, 1% of nonvoters in both survey years engaged 
in high political activity (See Figures 2.5 and 2.6) 
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How much Overreporting and by whom? 
The Catalist vote validation data that accompanies CCES survey data provided for 
the precise measurement of the proportion of true voters, honest nonvoters and over-
reporters in four studies. Description of the Catalist matching procedure along with high 
matching rates, and high overlap with matching provided by a second source indicate that 
vote validation can be very accurate and conducted with rigor. At the same time 
understating the how vote validation is implemented provides evidence to counter the 
arguments of those who question the accuracy of vote validation. This data also allowed 
for detailed analysis of the dominant demographics, political attitudes and levels of 
political engagement of voters, nonvoters and over-reporters.  Over-reporters were most 
similar to voters than nonvoters, but this similarity was characterized by substantial gaps. 
Over-reporters were sufficiently distinct from both voters and nonvoters to suggest that 
turnout models that are based on self-reported turnout will result in biased results. 
Overreporting of voter turnout is not only a possibility in political surveys, like 
the CCES, it is expected. The consistent rates of overreporting in four consecutive 
biennial CCES surveys supports the conclusion that overreporting regularly occurs in 
political surveys no matter the salience of the election during which they are conducted. 
Though the sampling frame of the CCES already results in higher rates of estimated 
turnout than those of official estimates overreporting also impedes the accurate 
estimation of turnout among survey respondents. Between 8% and 12% of post election 
respondents in the CCES over-reported their participation in the general elections of 2008 
through 2014. Overall, overreporting occurred at quite similar rates in CCES samples. 
However, overreporting did not occur uniformly among CCES nonvoters with rates of 
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overreporting that ranged from 19% to 42%. This suggests that measurement of 
overreporting is best performed by simultaneously identifying validated voters, honest 
nonvoters and over-reporters among all respondents within a survey sample. 
Over-reporters hold similarities to voters and nonvoters on almost the same 
numbers of characteristics (See Table 2.5). They were most similar with voters on eight 
characteristics, particularly on education, homeownership, partisan strength, political 
interest and political activity. Additionally, over-reporters were most similar to voters 
with respect to campaign contact in presidential election, and with respect to Black racial 
identification in the 2012 presidential election. Over-reporters were most similar with 
nonvoters on seven characteristics particularly on the subject of age, White racial 
identification, Hispanic ethnicity, and church attendance. They were also most similar to 
nonvoters regarding campaign contact and Black racial identification in the 2014 
midterm election, and most similar to nonvoters on political knowledge in the 2012 
presidential election. Finally, those who overreport are distinct with respect to median 
income and marital status overall, but also distinct on the matter of political knowledge in 
the 2014 midterm. These simultaneous similarities of over-reporters with both voters and 
nonvoters show that overreporting should be recognized as a significant source of bias in 
the study of voter turnout. What’s more, further study of overreporting is necessary to 
understand this phenomenon, chiefly on what is the cognitive mechanism through which 
overreporting occurs. 
The findings in this chapter provide the scaffolding for the subsequent chapters in 
this dissertation. Having concluded that the measurement of overreporting must occur 
alongside the measurement of validated turnout and nonvoting indicates that regression 
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modeling of overreporting should also occur along with modeling the probability of 
turning out to vote or not. I present a new approach to regression modeling of 
overreporting in the next chapter, and compare this new approach to past approaches. 
Furthermore, the conclusion that identification of the cognitive mechanism through 
which overreporting occurs is the basis for the fourth chapter in this dissertation. 
Table 2.5 Similarity of Over-reporters with Voters and Nonvoters in the CCES along 
Demographics, Socioeconomic Status, Type of Household, and Political Factors 
 More Like Voters More Like Nonvoters Distinct 
Mean Age  ✓  
% Female ✓   
% White  ✓  
% Black ✓ presidential ✓ midterm  
% Hispanic  ✓  
% College ✓   
Median Income   ✓ 
% Homeowners  ✓   
% Married   ✓ 
% Church Goers  ✓  
% Strong Partisans  ✓   
% Campaign Contact ✓ presidential ✓ midterm  
% High Political Interest ✓   
% High Political Knowledge  ✓ presidential ✓ midterm 
% High Political Activity ✓   
Total 8 7 3 
Columns indicate whether over-reporters in the 2014 and 2012 CCES studies are more similar to voters, 
more similar to nonvoters or distinct from both voters and nonvoters.  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
MODELING VOTER TURNOUT OVERREPORTS 
This chapter continues the task of engaging the debate of how to correctly 
measure overreporting, and directly addresses how to correctly model overreporting. 
Vote validation studies typically model the occurrence of voter turnout overreports using 
logistic regression analysis, a method that is most appropriate for use with dichotomous 
dependent variables. The most common dichotomous measurement of overreports 
restricts analysis to all respondents who are confirmed nonvoters and then identifies those 
who falsely reported that they turned out to vote. Studies that use this dichotomous 
measurement exclude validated voters from analysis, risk contamination with selection 
bias, and fail to recognize that respondents’ underlying probability of participating in an 
election could influence their probability of reporting participation. Furthermore, 
dichotomous measurement of overreporting impedes comparison of over-reporters with 
both voters and nonvoters, a necessary task to determine whether overreports are likely to 
bias predictive models of self-reported turnout.  
In Chapter 2, I proposed the simultaneous estimation of the proportion of over-
reporters, voters and nonvoters in surveys, which allowed for comparison of all three 
subgroups across multiple demographic, social and political characteristics in descriptive 
inference. Now, I propose that statistical modeling of overreports should be implemented 
using multinomial logistic regression for a multi category dependent variable with three 
outcomes: 1) validated voters, 2) honest nonvoters, and 3) over-reporters. This research 
design includes all subgroups of interest, eliminates possible contamination with 
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selection bias, and estimates both the probability of participation in an election and the 
probability of reporting participation. 
I use 2014 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) survey 
and Catalist vote validation data to measure and model overreports of voter turnout 
(Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014; 2012). I will compare dichotomous measurement to 
multi category measurement of overreports to examine whether different methods of 
measurement can affect descriptive inference. Then, I compare results from logistic and 
multinomial logistic regression analysis of overreporting to address the possible role of 
selection bias in the results of logit modeling. I will also compare plots of the marginal 
effects for all three outcomes in the 2014 and 2012 multinomial logistic models of 
overreporting. This will bring my discussion of the similarities between over-reporters 
and voters to a close.  
Selection Bias  
Selection bias in social science research occurs when the researcher does not 
select the observations under study independent of the outcome of interest, therefore 
selection is not random. When the observations under study are not randomly selected or 
are selected on the basis of a particular outcome, then statistical analysis can result in 
biased inference about social phenomena, in this case political phenomena. More 
specifically, the presence of selection bias in statistical modeling “yield[s] biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the effects of the independent variables” (Winship & Mare, 
1992: p. 328) on the dependent variable. Selection bias in statistical modeling can cause 
the researcher to underestimate or overestimate the importance of a particular variable or 
set of variables in predicting an outcome. 
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Dubin and Rivers (1989)12 illustrate the problem of selection bias using an 
example from political science: analysis of vote choice/preference. Most studies of vote 
choice would restrict their analysis to only voters, but nonvoters also have preferences. 
Excluding nonvoters from analysis leaves researchers with a self-selected sample that 
precludes them from observing “the relationship between demographic characteristics 
and political preferences in the population as a whole” (p.360). The authors explain that: 
“If turnout and preference are unrelated there should be no bias in 
estimating a model of preference based on the subsample of voters whose 
preference is observed. To the degree that there are common factors 
determining both turnout and preference, turnout is a source of selection 
bias” (p. 383).  
 
More specifically, excluding nonvoters from analysis “is likely to produce misleading 
conclusions” (p. 383) about vote preference. You cannot make generalizations about vote 
preference to the whole population when you have restricted data analysis to a self-
selected sample.  
Selection bias is a potential problem with traditional logistic regression modeling 
of overreporting. Engagement in overreporting is dependent on whether a survey 
respondent participated or not in the election under study. Consequently, restricting 
statistical analysis of overreporting to the population of nonvoters within a survey, as 
Anderson and Silver (1986) suggest, does not account for the individual respondent’s 
probability of turning out to vote (or not) before estimating their probability of 
overreporting turnout. Logistic regression analysis of overreporting based on 
                                                
12 Dubin and Rivers (1989) also describe an example of selection bias in econometrics: “For example, in 
analyzing the relationship between schooling and earnings, we only have earnings data for those who are 
employed. Labor-force participation is voluntary. Some people choose not to work, others are unable to 
find work they considerable acceptable. The employed sample is unlikely to be a random subset of the 
entire population and there is no reliable way to impute earnings to those who are unemployed” (p. 361).  
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dichotomous measurements would provide estimates that are conditional on 
nonparticipation; therefore, those estimates could be contaminated with selection bias.  
Selection bias is a topic of research in social science onto itself, particularly in the 
disciplines of economics and sociology (Berk, 1983, Heckman, 1990). Scholars of 
selection bias have affirmed that it is naturally occurring in social processes and that its 
presence should not deter scholars from conducting research, and they have developed 
models that correct for its effect on correlational analysis (Winship & Mare, 1992). 
Heckman’s two-stage model is the most widely used approach for correcting selection 
bias. However, in the case of modeling the likelihood of overreporting this approach is 
not appropriate. Why? Because vote validation literature has demonstrated that factors 
that determine the likelihood of turning out to vote also more or less determine the 
likelihood of reporting turnout. And, Heckman’s correction assumes that the factors that 
determine the outcome at the first stage are unrelated to the outcome at the second stage 
(Heckman, 1990), here participation versus nonparticipation at the first stage, then 
reporting participation versus reporting nonparticipation at the second stage. 
A truly unbiased model of overreporting would include both voters and nonvoters, 
and would simultaneously estimate a respondent’s probability of participating in an 
election and their probability of falsely reporting turnout. For this reason, I propose 
multinomial logistic regression as the correct approach for modeling overreports in order 
to exclude possible selection bias from the results. Multinomial logistic regression is used 
to predict the probabilities of the different possible outcomes of a categorical dependent 
variable with multiple categories that cannot be ordered in a meaningful way (Menard, 
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2002). With this method I can estimate the effect of traditional predictors of turnout on 
three categorical outcomes 1) voting, 2) nonvoting, and 3) over-reporting.  
Measuring Overreports 
I use 2014 and 2012 CCES survey and Catalist vote validation data to measure 
and model overreports of voter turnout in surveys. Again, the CCES is biennial large 
sample online survey that includes a pre election and post election wave questionnaire. 
The 2014 CCES had a little over 56,000 respondents and the 2012 CCES had 
approximately 54,500 respondents. During the post election wave these respondents are 
asked to report their registration status and whether they turned out to vote in the general 
election under study. In addition to these self-reports of registration and turnout the 
CCES includes vote validation conducted by the progressive political data firm Catalist. 
Self-reports and vote validation data allow for the identification of validated voters, 
honest nonvoters and over-reporters in both the 2014 and 2012 CCES. 
I use the available self-report and validation data to compare the typical 
dichotomous measurement of overreports to my multi category measurement. Vote 
validation studies have implemented validity checks on reported turnout by various 
means, but there are two typical dichotomous methods of identifying overreports of voter 
turnout is survey research. The first and least common method identifies the proportion of 
actual nonvoters among all respondents who reported turning out to vote.13 The second 
and most common method identifies the proportion of respondents who claimed to have 
turned out to vote among all nonvoters in a survey. In their essay “Measurement and 
                                                
13 This method is used in Chapter 4, because it is the most appropriate method for the analysis carried out 
there. Otherwise, the best practice is to estimate the proportion of validated voters, honest nonvoters and 
over-reporters among all survey respondents in a post election questionnaire. 
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Mismeasurement of the Validity of the Self-Reported Vote,” Anderson and Silver (1986) 
argue that this second method of estimating the rate of overreporting turnout in surveys is 
the correct one. They maintain that this measurement reflects the true “propensity of 
respondents in a given survey to overreport voting” (p.771). Moreover, they propose that 
overreports should be estimated from the “population at risk” of overreporting, namely 
nonvoters. Here is their logic: 
“Voting is a socially desirable behavior. Many people who do not engage 
in this desirable behavior claim that they do, but almost no one who in fact 
performs this desirable behavior denies it. Since it is nonvoters who risk 
being socially stigmatized by failing to conform to the social norm, it is 
nonvoters who are the appropriate population at risk for calculating the 
extent of [overreporting].” (p. 775) 
 
Table 3.1 Over-reporters Among Nonvoters in the CCES 
CCES Survey Year Total Nonvoters Honest Nonvoters Over-Reporters 
2014 14,065 100% 
10,296 
73% 
3,769 
25% 
2012 11,192 100% 
7,116 
64% 
4,077 
36% 
Columns show weighted total and percent of nonvoters among CCES matched respondents by self-
reported turnout to identify honest nonvoters and over-reporters. 
 
This dichotomous mode of measurement affects descriptive inference concerning 
the incidence of overreporting in surveys. The rate of overreporting in the 2014 and 2012 
CCES studies is of 25% and 36% respectively (See Table 3.1) when specified as false 
self-reports of turnout among nonvoters. Honest nonvoters are defined in this research as 
the sum of respondents who reported that they were not registered to vote in the post 
election wave of the CCES along with validated nonvoters and non-matched respondents 
who reported nonparticipation. Over-reporters are defined as validated nonvoters who 
reported that they definitely turned out vote. In the case of this definition of 
overreporting, there is a higher rate of overreporting among nonvoters during the 
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presidential election than during the midterm election, differing by twelve percentage 
points. However, the multichotomous measurement of electoral participation and 
participation reports that I propose deflates the observed rate of overreporting in both 
CCES studies bringing the proportion of overreports among all post election respondents 
within one percentage point of each other, 9% in 2014 and 10% in 2012. The rate of 
overreporting is only slightly higher in the presidential election year study than in the 
midterm. As excepted there is a larger rate of turnout in the presidential election with 
73% turnout in 2012, seven percentage points higher that in 2014. Here validated voters 
are all post election respondents with a confirmed record of voting. Evidently, 
simultaneous estimation of the proportion of validated voters, honest nonvoters and over-
reporters provides a more complete picture of actual participation and reported 
participation than dichotomous measurement of overreporting. 
Table 3.2 CCES Respondents by Vote Validation Status and Reported Turnout 
CCES Survey 
Year Total Validated Voters 
Honest 
Nonvoters Over-Reporters 
2014 40,713 100% 
26,648 
66% 
10,296 
25% 
3,769 
9% 
2012 41,242 100% 
30,050 
73% 
7,116 
17% 
4,077 
10% 
Columns show weighted total and percent by CCES year of validated nonvoters, nonvoters who 
honestly reported non-participation and validated nonvoters who overreported turnout. Percentages 
are rounded up to the nearest integer. 
 
Modeling Overreports of Voter Turnout 
Statistical modeling through the use of regression analysis allows researchers to 
describe the relationship between a variable of interest and a set of predictor variables. In 
this chapter, I seek to describe the relationship between overreporting turnout, the 
variable of interest, and traditional predictors of voter turnout, a set of predictor variables. 
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Descriptive inference in Chapter 2 allowed a comparison of voter, nonvoters and over-
reporters across demographic, social and political characteristics that revealed somewhat 
greater commonalities between over-reporters and voters than with nonvoters. However, 
the need to estimate the effect that these factors have on predicting a respondent’s 
probability of engaging in overreporting is not nullified by the identification of the 
dominant characteristics of over-reporters. Regression results can help researchers 
identify the key predictors of a certain outcome, like overreporting, and distinguish 
between the predictors of the outcome of interest and those of other outcomes, like voting 
and nonvoting.  
Vote validation scholarship has engaged in statistical modeling of overreports 
using both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (Ansolabehere & Hersh, 201214) and logistic 
regression analysis (Belli, Traugott & Beckman, 2001; Górecki, 2011; Brenner, 2012). Of 
course, OLS regression is not the most appropriate method to model overreporting 
because the dependent variable is often not continuous, and there is no assumption of a 
linear relationship between the dependent variable and its predictors.  
Dichotomous methods of measuring overreports have determined the way 
overreports haven been statistically modeled in political science. The dependent variable 
is constructed as an indicator variable that assigns a value of zero (0) to honest nonvoters 
and a value of one (1) to over-reporters. Statistical models that use this dependent 
variable thus estimate the likelihood that a nonvoter reported turning out to vote instead 
of being honest about their nonparticipation. Logistic regression analysis is used when 
the outcome variable of interest is categorical, particularly for dichotomous variables like 
                                                
14 Ansolabehere and Hersh (2012) report results of logistics regression analysis in the appendix of their 
published article and OLS regression results in the body of the paper.  
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those usually used to estimate overreporting in the existing vote validation literature; 
therefore, most vote validation scholars model overreports using logistic regression 
analysis (Belli, Traugott & Beckman, 2001; Górecki, 2011; Brenner, 2012).  
Nevertheless, I argue that dichotomous measurement is not the correct method for 
estimating the incidence of overreporting in a survey, nor is logistic regression analysis of 
overreporting the correct function for statistically modeling the relationship between 
overreporting and traditional predictors of voter turnout. I propose estimation of how the 
joint probability of being in one of three groups depends on thirteen (13) variables 
through multinomial logistic regression; the groups are validated voters, nonvoters or 
over-reporters. I create a categorical variable with three values going from 0 to 2 that 
represents each group. As I mention before, validated voters are all post election 
respondents with a confirmed record of voting. These respondents are given a value of 
zero (0). Nonvoters or honest nonvoters include all self-reported nonregistered 
respondents and all self-reported nonvoters, either matched or unmatched, and a given a 
value of one (1). Over-reporters are the reference category and are given a value of two 
(2); over-reporters are all post election validated nonvoters who self-reported turning out 
to vote. 
I include thirteen independent variables in the predictive models of overreporting 
that I present in this chapter. These are the same thirteen demographic, social and 
political factors that where used in Chapter 2 for descriptive inference, and are all 
considered common predictors of voter turnout and political participation. Describing the 
size and significance of their effect on the likelihood of being an over-reporter is 
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ultimately pertinent to discussing how overreports of voter turnout can bias predictive 
models of turnout. 
I include three demographic variables that measure age, gender and race. These 
three factors have been identified as significant predictors of electoral participation in the 
past (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Brady, Schlozman, 1995). It is a well know 
fact that the older a person is the more likely they are to participate in elections. Age is 
coded as a continuous variable generated from CCES respondent’s reported year of birth. 
Subtracting the year in which the study was conducted from year of birth results in 
respondents’ age, all CCES respondents are 18 years of age or older. Gender is measured 
with a dichotomous variable where female is the indicator (female=1, male=0). In the 
past, men where found to participate in politics that women, however, women now 
turnout to vote at higher rates than men. Race is also a dichotomous variable because 
white Americans generally turnout to vote more than all other non-white Americans. 
Self-identified white respondents were given a value of zero (0) and all other “non-white” 
respondents were given a value of one (1).  
Resource models of turnout particularly emphasize the importance of 
socioeconomic status as something that can foretell whether an individual will turnout to 
vote or not. Family income and education are used here as indicators of socioeconomic 
status. Family income is a multi category variable with sixteen values where each 
category represents an income range; it starts with “less than $10,000” and ends with 
“more than $500,000.” Education is a variable that measures CCES respondents’ level of 
educational attainment with six category variable. Education categories include “no high 
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school,” “high school graduate” and four additional categories that measure differing 
levels of college education. 
Additional social characteristics including homeownership, marital status and 
religiosity are also factors that American political science finds to be related to political 
participation. Here I code homeownership as a dummy variable where homeowners are 
given a value of one (1) and all other respondents including renters are given a value of 
zero. Marital status is represented as a dichotomous variable recoded from the “marital 
status” question where “married” is the indicator. Religiosity is measured with self-
reports of church attendance, a variable with six categories. I recoded the original 
variable to give frequent churchgoing the highest value, described as “more than once a 
week” among the response alternatives.  
Finally, I also include five political characteristics that are also traditionally 
related to voter turnout, these are: partisan strength, campaign contact, interest in politics, 
political knowledge and political activity. Strong partisanship is thought to be an 
indicator of how much a person cares about the outcomes of elections, something that can 
motivate individuals to participate in elections. I recode the seven-point party 
identification item from the CCES into a dummy variable where both strong Democrats 
and strong Republicans are given value of one (1) and all other respondents are given a 
value of zero (0). Campaign contact measures reception of mobilization efforts and 
pressure to participate; this is also a dummy variable representing contact (1) versus no 
contact (0).  
The following three variables represent measures of self-motivated political 
engagement. Interest in politics seeks to asses how closely a CCES respondent follows 
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what is happening “in government and public affairs.” This variable has four values and 
was recoded to give following politics “most of the time” the highest value and “hardly at 
all” the lowest value. Political knowledge is a count variable that indicates how many 
correct identifications a respondent was able to achieve for six questions regarding 
partisanship of their corresponding federal and state level elected public officials in 
addition to identifying the majority party of each chamber of Congress at the time of the 
survey. Values for this variable range from 0 to 6. The last variable included in my model 
specification is political activity. This is also a count variable with values ranging from 0 
to 3 that represents the number voluntary political activities a respondent carried out in 
the time preceding the election under study. The three activities are attending a local 
political meeting, putting up a political sign, and working for a candidate or campaign.  
The existing literature on overreporting has found commonalities between the 
predictors of overreporting and those of voter turnout. I estimate statistical models of 
overreporting with two different, but comparable, probability functions using the above 
described independent variables. The results from these estimations demonstrate why 
multinomial logistic regression is the correct method for modeling overreports and why 
overreports are a source of bias in the prevailing literature on voter turnout.  
Results 
Figure 3.1 presents a visual representation of the estimated coefficients for the 
effect of the independent variables in the models on overreporting in two plots. These 
coefficients were estimated from multinomial logistic and logistic regressions that predict 
the probability of being an over-reporter in the 2014 and 2012 CCES. Again, the 
multinomial logistic regression estimates membership in three groups validated voters, 
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honest nonvoter and over-reporters. The coefficients in the logistic and multinomial 
logistic regressions presented here are comparable estimates because they both show log 
odds of being an over-reporter versus and honest nonvoter, consequently no 
transformation needs to made to the raw results in order to make direct comparisons. At 
first glance both plots give the impression that the size and direction of the effect of each 
independent variable resulting from both methods are practically the same, and this is 
nearly the case. However, there are six instances in 2014, and other five instances in 2012 
where the results from the logistic model differ from those the multinomial logistic 
model. Those cases include the effect of age, church attendance, political interest, 
political knowledge and political activity in 2014, and the effect of age, race, family 
income, political knowledge and political activity in 2012. 
There are two contrasting results that standout in the models estimated for the 
2014 CCES, the coefficients for non-white race and those for church attendance. In the 
case of the effect of non-white race on overreporting, the size of the effect was virtually 
the same, but the significance level is higher in the multinomial logit model than in the 
binomial logit model, a p<0.05 level and a p<0.1 level of significance respectively. 
Church attendance represents a more extreme case, where this variable is not a 
statistically significant predictor of overreporting in the logit model, but is a significant 
predictor in the multinomial logit model at the p<0.05 level. There are four variables for 
which the significance level of their effect on the probability of being an over-reporter is 
the same in both multinomial logistic and binomial logistic regression models in the 2014 
CCES, significant at the p<0.01 level, but the size of their effect is somewhat larger in the 
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logit model than in the multinomial logit model.15 The differences between the results of 
the multinomial logit and binomial logit model of overreporting are even less apparent 
for the data from the 2012 CCES.16 It is of note that while the dummy variable measuring 
the impact of non-white race on the probability of being an over-reporter was significant 
in both the logit and multinomial logit models for 2014 it is not a significant predictor in 
2012, a factor that has been consistently found to be a key predictor of overreporting 
(Traugott & Katosh, 1979; Abramson & Claggett, 1984, 1986, 1981; Anderson, Silver & 
Abramson, 1988).  
Though the differences between the estimates resulting from the proposed 
multinomial logit model and those from the traditional binomial logit model of 
overreporting in Figure 3.1 appear to be very small, the overall cumulative differences 
support my argument that logit modeling may be contaminated with selection bias. The 
shifts in the size and statistical significance of the effect of church attendance in the 
models for 2014 particularly evince how different modeling methods can impact the 
relationships observed between the outcome of interest and a set of predictor variables. 
Furthermore, the multinomial logit model ensures that selectivity is not a source of bias 
in statistical models that are meant to help us further understand the phenomenon of 
                                                
15 The coefficient for the effect of age in on predicting overreporting is greater in logit regression than in 
the multinomial logit regression differing by 0.112 decimal points. The effect of interest in politics is larger 
by in the logit model by 0.103 decimal points, that of political knowledge by 0.151 decimal points, and that 
of political activity by 0.260 decimal points (See Table A.3 in the Appendix). These differences are not 
significant. 
 
16 The effect of non-white race though not significant is 0.128 decimal points larger in the multinomial logit 
model. One factor, political knowledge, despite maintaining the same high level of significance in both 
models the coefficient in the logit model is 0.076 decimal points larger than that in the multinomial logit 
model. Also, three additional variables had substantially larger effects on the probability of overreporting in 
the multinomial logit regression then in the binomial logit regression while maintaining a p<0.01 level of 
significance. The coefficient for the effect of age is 0.145 decimal points larger, that of income is 0.069 
decimal points larger, and that of political activity is 0.096 decimal points larger (See Table A.4 in the 
Appendix). These differences are not significant. 
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overreporting. Thus, even if large selection bias is not observed, it is still important to 
estimate the most correct model. 
Figure 3.1  
Coefficient Plots of Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regressions 
Predicting Overreporting in the 2014 & 2012 CCES 
 
 
The key predictors of becoming an over-reporter which are consistent across 2014 
and 2012 can be identified in figure 3.1, these are: age (positive in 2014 and negative in 
2012), homeownership, strong partisanship identity, campaign contact, interest in 
politics, political knowledge, and political activity. Five of these seven key predictors are 
political characteristics, which suggests that heightened awareness of the democratic 
norm of voting is at play in the incidence of overreporting. Moreover, this evidence 
supports the social desirability theory of overreporting articulated in this dissertation 
Note: Plots present the estimated coefficients with 95% confidence intervals from weighted logistic and 
multinomial logistic regressions predicting the probability of being an over-reporter in the 2014 and 2012 CCES.
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because heightened awareness and internalization of the social meaning of voting (Rolfe, 
2012) is a clear motivation for falsely reporting turnout. Some other characteristics were 
impactful, but were impactful only either in the midterm 2014 CCES or impactful in the 
2012 presidential year CCES. For example, female gender had a significant negative 
effect on the likelihood of overreporting in the 2014 CCES but not in the 2012 CCES. 
Also, non-white race and education had a positive significant effect on becoming an over-
reporter in the midterm election but not in the presidential election. Family income and 
church attendance had positive and significant effects on the likelihood of overreporting 
in the 2012 CCES. 
Figure 3.2 presents a graphical representation of average marginal effects for all 
three outcomes of becoming a validated voter, honest nonvoter and over-reporter in the 
multinomial logit regressions for the 2014 and 2012 CCES. The data points in both years 
show that over-reporters occupy a middle ground between voters and honest nonvoters. 
Still, the average marginal effects of the independent variables predicting membership 
among over-reporters follow a pattern that is most similar to that of the effects for 
nonvoters. Overall, the marginal effects for becoming an over-reporter are consistently 
closer to those of becoming a nonvoter in both survey years under study in five instances. 
The cases of consistent similarity between over-reporters and nonvoters across both 
survey years are age, non-white race, marital status, campaign contact and political 
knowledge. The same is true in only four instances where the marginal effects of 
becoming an over-reporter are closer to those of becoming a voter; these are: 
homeownership, church attendance, political interest, and political activity. What’s more, 
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in 2014 seven out of thirteen times results for overreporting are closer to those of 
nonvoting, and eight out of thirteen times in 2012. 
Figure 3.2 
2014 & 2012 CCES Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Average Marginal Effects for Validated Voter, Honest Nonvoter and Over-reporter 
 
The fact that over-reporters occupy a middle ground between validated voters and 
honest nonvoters suggests that members of this group have a higher probability of going 
out to vote than that of honest nonvoters, but not high enough to make them go to the 
polls on Election Day. Moreover, the consistent similarity between the data points for 
over-reporters and nonvoters in Figure 3.2 show that overall survey researchers should 
not expect members of this group to turnout in the first place. Yet, the heightened 
underlying probability of turning out to vote among over-reporters could be one of the 
reasons why they falsely report participation in elections. As Ansolabehere and Hersh 
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(2012) explain, self-reports of turnout may actually be more representative of the 
population of those who think of themselves as voters rather than representative of those 
who are actual voters. This is to say, that despite being unlikely to turnout to vote, over-
reporters seem to think of themselves as voters.  
It is noteworthy that female gender has no importance to predicting turnout, 
nonvoting or over-reporting in 2014, though it is a significant predictor of turnout in 
2012. Another interesting finding that regarding marital status, being married has no 
impact on any of the three outcomes predicted in the multinomial logit models for 2014 
and 2012. At the same time, the are multiple factors that appear to be more impactful on 
the likelihood of being a validated voter and that of being an honest nonvoter than on 
probability of being an over-reporter. For example, family income has a greater influence 
on the likelihood of turning out to vote and that of nonvoting than on the likelihood of 
overreporting. More importantly, age, campaign contact, political interest, political 
knowledge and political activity are of import in predicting overreporting in both 2014 
and 2012. These are the key predictors of overreporting turnout in the CCES. 
Conclusion 
The results presented in this chapter contradict any existing allegations that over-
reporters are “just like voters” and that survey researchers need not be concerned with 
overreporting. Of course, if the traditional predictors of turnout had the same statistical 
relationships with the probability of voting and that of over-reporting, then research on 
the phenomenon of overreporting would not continue to be a relevant area of study today. 
The use of multinomial logistic regression modeling allowed for a comparison of the 
effects of these predictors on over-reporting, nonvoting and voting. Joint estimation of 
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the probability of participation and that of reporting participation was necessary to 
identify the key predictors of overreporting, and to definitively demonstrate that over-
reporters are a distinct group that shares characteristics with both voter and nonvoters.  
Interestingly, the political characteristics included in the models were the most 
important factors in predicting overreporting. Campaign contact, political interest, 
political knowledge and political activity can all be considered indirect measurements of 
heightened awareness and internalization of the democratic norm of voting and its social 
meaning. This suggests that avoidance of social stigmatization for not participating in a 
socially desirable behavior like voting could be the cause of overreporting surveys. 
Furthermore, since over-reporters are not “just like voters” it is necessary to continue to 
study why overreporting occurs; more specifically, to identify what is the cognitive 
mechanism through which it occurs. The following chapter directly examines the social 
desirability theory of overreporting using new data and methods to detect deception in 
false reports of turnout.  
 
CHAPTER 4 
OVERREPORTING TAKES TIME 
Overreports of voter turnout provide false information to survey researchers. A 
number of respondents present themselves as voters, when they are actually nonvoters, 
causing scholars of voting behavior to overestimate participation in elections. I 
demonstrated this trend in the second chapter of this dissertation by presenting rates of 
overestimation in the CCES using both aggregate and individual level data to show that 
overreporting occurs consistently in four consecutive biennial studies. In this fourth 
chapter, I examine the merits of the social desirability theory of overreporting outlined in 
the first chapter. I directly test the first implication drawn for the widely held assumption 
that overreporting is caused by socially desirable responding (SDR). That is, if 
overreports are caused by SDR, then they themselves are the result of deception on behalf 
of survey respondents. I also extrapolate conclusions from the analysis here presented 
regarding the second implication of the social desirability assumption of overreporting. 
That overreporting must be equivalent to one of two main types of SDR, impression 
management or self-deception.   
Vote validation scholars, for the most part, have attributed overreporting to social 
desirability bias, but have focused almost entirely on measuring the incidence of 
overreporting, and identifying the individual level factors that make survey respondents 
falsely report participation in elections without seeking to further understand the 
deceptive nature of turnout overreports (Parry and Crossley, 1950; Clausen, 1968; Silver 
and Anderson, 1986; Katosh and Traugott, 1981; Karp and Brockington, 2005). Some 
scholars suggest that overreports are the result of memory failure and that survey 
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respondents easily forget whether they voted or not (Adamany & Du Bois, 1974; 
Abelson, Loftus & Greenwald, 1992; Stocké & Stark, 2007; Belli, Traugott & Beckman, 
1999; Belli, Moore & Van Hoewyk, 2006). Also, others argue that overreporting is an 
artifact of poor record keeping and not a result of misreporting, intentional or otherwise 
(Abramson & Claggett, 1992; Cassel, 2003 & 2004; Berent, Krosnick & Lupia, 2011 & 
2016), even though Ansolabehere and Hersh (2010) have found that public registration 
and turnout record keeping throughout the United States has little to do with turnout 
overestimation in surveys. In spite of with these alternative explanations, most studies of 
overreporting suggest that SDR is the cause of this particular form of response bias. For 
this reason, this chapter is concerned with finding evidence to support, or refute, the 
assumption that social desirability bias is to blame for the phenomenon of voter turnout 
overreports. 
SDR, a form of response bias in surveys, at its core has one fundamental purpose; 
it allows survey respondents “to give overly positive self-descriptions” (Paulhus, 2002: p. 
50) regarding their attitudes and behaviors when answering questionnaires. Similarly, 
overreports of turnout help nonvoters present themselves in a positive light by appearing 
to fulfill the democratic norm of voting. Ultimately, the result of both overreporting and 
SDR is the collection of untruthful self-descriptions in surveys, which at the same time 
bias survey data. It seems obvious to assume that SDR is what causes overreporting 
because “the social meaning of voting is uncontested” and failing to participate in 
elections is a violation of a fundamental act of democratic citizenship (Rolfe, 2012). 
However, the literature on SDR provides methods for identifying social desirability bias 
in association with particularly sensitive questions, and political scientists should never 
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leave things to conjecture. Moreover, if the goal is to create more accurate measurements 
of turnout based on self-reports researchers must understand whether overreporting is 
actually associated with SDR, and, if so, whether overreporting fits one of the two main 
types of SDR. The first type, impression management is “the tendency to give favorable 
self-descriptions to others”, and the second, self-deception is “the tendency to give 
favorably biased but honestly held self-descriptions” (Paulhus & Reid, 1991). These two 
types of SDR differ mainly in intentionality, one is intentional other-deception while the 
other is unconscious self-deception. 
Having said that, how can one empirically determine whether overreports are 
tantamount to responses born from deception? I borrow methods and frameworks from 
the lie detection and deception literature to ascertain the deceptive nature of 
overreporting. Response latencies, the time it takes to answer a question in a survey, have 
proven to be helpful indicators in detecting deception, and cognitive social psychology 
has found a consistent causal link between deceptive responses and lengthier response 
times (Mayerl et al., 2005; Vendemia, Buzan & Green, 2005; Verschuere et al., 2011; 
Walczyk et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2009). Additionally, self-deceptive responses have 
been found to have similar response latencies to those of honest responses, while other-
deceptive responses have significantly longer latencies than both self-deceptive and 
honest responses (Holtgraves, 2004).  
The research question in this chapter is: Does overreporting turnout require higher 
cognitive effort manifested as lengthier response latencies for the vote self-report 
question? I answer this question by using response latency data from the 2012 and 2014 
CCES to measure the cognitive effort it takes to report turning out to vote. I use the 
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Catalist voter file data included in the CCES to identify over-reporters and carry out 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis to estimate the effect of overreporting 
on response latencies. Results show that response latencies associated with the vote self-
report question are significantly longer among over-reporters than among validated voters 
who honestly report participation. Higher levels of cognitive effort in turnout overreports 
evinces the intentionality of these false responses and supports the notion that overreports 
are the result of SDR. I also address the possible role of memory failure as the source of 
lengthier response latencies. 
Response Latencies and Deception 
Response latencies measure the time it takes individuals to answer individual 
questions within surveys. Researchers can use these measurements as indicators of “the 
information processing involved in answering survey questions” (Mulligan et al., 2003: p. 
292). In other words, response latencies signal the level of cognitive effort involved in 
responding to questionnaire items. Mayerl (2013) explains that “response latencies are 
used as a proxy measure of spontaneous versus thoughtful responses” (p. 2), and that 
some response effects, like SDR, require high cognitive effort resulting in longer 
response latencies. Political science has most often used response latencies to test 
relationship between the speed of answers and strength of attitudes (Huckfeldt & Levine 
et al., 1999; Huckfeldt & Sprague et al., 2000; Mulligan et al., 2003; Burdein et al., 
2006). Though political science has not used response latency measures in relation to 
reports of political behavior, cognitive social psychology has well established that 
deception reliably increases response latencies when answering multiple question types 
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(Mayerl et al., 2005; Vendemia, Buzan & Green, 2005; Verschuere et al., 2011; Walczyk 
et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2009).  
Why does deception increase response latencies? Telling the truth is easier and 
deception/lying is more cognitively taxing because truth telling is the human default. 
Again, lying results in longer response times because lying requires more thought 
processing, while truth telling is spontaneous. Verschuere and colleagues (2011) 
demonstrated that the human default is truth telling in an experiment using a design 
similar to that of the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). 
Subjects were assigned to two treatment conditions, frequent truth and frequent lie, and a 
control condition. The control condition required equal proportions truth and lie 
responses. Participants were instructed to answer yes/no questions that appeared on a 
computer screen by hitting two keys on a computer keyboard, one key for a “yes” 
response and one for a “no” response. The color in which questions appeared on the 
screen indicated whether they were to lie or not. They found that respondents in the 
“frequent truth condition” had significantly longer response latencies for responses that 
required them to lie. That is, while the average response latency for truth responses under 
this condition was approximately 1.35s the average for their lie responses was of 
approximately 1.70s, a difference of 0.35s. More importantly, they found a significant 
difference between truth and lie response latencies in the control condition. Their average 
truth response latency was of approximately 1.55s while their average lie response 
latency was 1.75s, a difference of 0.20s. That deceptive responses had lengthier latencies 
in the control condition indicates that under normal circumstances we can already expect 
deception to result in increased response latencies. 
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The Activation-Decision-Construction model (ADCM) is a cognitive model of 
deception that maps the process and structure of lying (Walczyk et al., 2003). This model 
explains why providing deceptive answers should take longer than answering honestly, 
arguing that deceptive responses involve three cognitive events. First, there is an 
activation component where the respondent receives the stimuli, meaning the question is 
read or heard, which activates information stored memory. The second event involves the 
decision to lie or not, whether or not to report the information activated in memory. Then 
third, once the respondent has decided to deceive, they must construct the lie. Hence, 
engaging in these three cognitive processes has a direct effect on increasing the time it 
takes to answer a question. 
In their study, Walczyk and colleagues (2003) conducted two experiments. The 
first had two experimental conditions where participants were either instructed to answer 
honestly or lie when asked factual yes/no and open-ended questions. This experiment was 
designed to asses the effect of memory activation and response construction on response 
latencies. Participants in the lie condition had response times that were an average 0.23s 
longer for yes/no questions and an average 0.23s longer for open-ended questions than 
those of participants in the truth condition. The second experiment included a third 
condition where participants were instructed to answer honestly except when asked 
questions they “might normally lie about if asked by a stranger” in order to asses the 
decision component of lying. Results show that participants freely deciding to lie on 
sensitive questions had an average response latency that was 0.15s longer for yes/no lies 
and 0.34s longer for open-ended deceptive responses. This means that the mere decision 
to lie results in an increase in the length of response latencies.  
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Memory Failure and Turnout Overreports 
Multiple vote validation studies explore the role of memory failure in augmenting 
the incidence of turnout overreports in surveys. Belli, Traugott and Beckman (2001) state 
that “it has yet to be firmly established whether respondents are being intentionally 
deceptive or whether the misreporting is due to memory confusion about one's actual 
voting behavior in the most recent election” (p. 494). They argue that both cognitive 
factors, social desirability bias and memory failure, can be involved in the occurrence of 
overreporting. In a previous paper, Belli and Traugott (1999) along with other scholars 
find that overreporting “is predicted to become more pronounced with increases in 
elapsed time between the election and the interview” (p. 93). More specifically, they find 
that overreporting increases from the first week to the second week after the election and 
state that this finding is evidence that memory failure is one of the cognitive processes at 
play. What’s more, Belli, Moore and Van Hoewyk (2006) propose “that these two 
processes [social desirability and memory failure] operate concurrently when a 
respondent is queried about their voting behavior” (p. 752). The cognitive effort 
demanded by searching one’s memory of a particular event, like voting in an election, 
might grow as the time elapsed from the event itself also grows in addition to the 
increased effort generated by social desirability concerns. Consequently, the time it takes 
for respondents in a survey to report whether they voted or not in an election could 
increase the further away from the election the interview is conducted.  
Expectations 
I apply the ADCM model and the memory failure perspective to analysis of self-
reports of turnout and in doing so set expectations for the effect of overreporting on the 
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response latencies associated with the turnout question. When respondents are asked 
whether they went out to vote in an election their memory is activated, and information 
about participation or non-participation will become available in their minds. Increases in 
the time elapsed between the election and the survey administration will slow the process 
of searching for memory of the event. Individuals who actually went out to vote will have 
little incentive to lie, so they will use the memory of voting to report participation, and 
nonvoters will decide whether to lie about going out to vote. Once they have decided to 
be deceptive having chosen to present themselves to the researchers as voters they will 
falsely report that they “definitely voted in the General Election.” Those who choose to 
be honest about their non-participation will go on to make an honest report.  
The turnout question provides a closed set of response alternatives; this eliminates 
the need to engage in the third cognitive process of lie construction outlined by the 
ACDM model. Necessarily, survey respondents who overreport turnout should have 
longer response latencies than those who honestly report participation because the 
decision to deceive, on its own, has been found to lengthen response times.  
Nevertheless, the ADCM model does not account for self-deception. Self-
deceptive answers do not fit this model, but the literature on SDR provides a framework 
that fills this gap. Using an experimental design and response latencies Holtgraves (2004) 
found that socially desirable responses take longer than honest answers, but that 
“…participants scoring high on the trait of self-deception were generally faster at making 
these judgments [deciding whether to lie or not] than participants scoring low on self-
deception” in the Self-deception Scale of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
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Responding.17 Consequently, self-deceptive responses should emulate the ease of 
providing honest answers, because respondents who engage in this type of SDR believe 
they are responding honestly to survey questions when making an inaccurate report.18 
Response latencies of self-deceptive responses should not be significantly different from 
the response latencies associated with honest responses. Thus, finding a significant 
difference between the response latencies of accurate and false turnout self-reports would 
show that overreports are likely associated with intentional other-deception. 
Data and Methods 
I test my hypotheses using the 2012 and 2014 CCES surveys (Ansolabehere & 
Schaffner, 2013; 2015a), which I already describe in Chapter 2 along with the Catalist 
vote validation matching process, these are the only CCES datasets with that include 
response latency data. It is worth repeating that these studies have 54,535 respondents in 
2012 and 56,200 respondents in 2014, and include both a pre-election and a post-election 
questionnaire that are administered in close proximity to the election. The pre-election 
questionnaire asks respondents about their political attitudes regarding a wide range of 
issues and about their vote preferences in the up coming election. The post-election has a 
shorter set of items asking mostly about voting behavior and vote choices in the election 
that just occurred. Additionally, there is vote validation data regarding both registration 
and participation of its respondents in the corresponding General Election of the year the 
survey was conducted. Using data from an online self-administered survey like the CCES 
                                                
17 In 1984 Paulhus developed the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) to assess individual 
differences in SDR by including an Impression Management Scale and a Self-Deception Scale in survey 
instruments. 
 
18 For example, in episode 102 of the TV show Seinfeld, Jerry gets into a situation were he has to take a 
polygraph. When Jerry asks George Costanza for advice on how to beat the lie detector test George says: 
“Jerry, just remember. It’s not a lie… if you believe it.” 
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constitutes a hard case for finding any social desirability effects on voter turnout self-
reports because online surveys have been found to increase report of sensitive 
information and reduce the rate of socially desirable responses to sensitive questions 
(Kreuter et al., 2008). 
The analysis in this chapter will be focused on respondents who said they 
“definitely voted” in the General Election of 2012 and 2014. In order to create more 
accurate response latency measures I have created subsets of these two datasets. First, I 
eliminate from my analysis all respondents who were not matched to the Catalist voter 
file for a total 43,342 in the 2012 CCES and 39,415 matched respondents in the 2014 
CCES. Second, I exclude all remaining respondents from the state of Virginia because 
this state does not make records of participation in elections publicly available, reducing 
the sample to 42,158 for 2012 and to 38,392 for 2014. Finally, I keep only those who said 
they “definitely voted in the General Election,” making the final total for analysis a 
sample of 32,846 for the 2012 CCEs and 29,424 for the 2014 CCES (See Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 CCES Respondents by Match Status and Self-Reported Turnout 
CCES Total Sample  Matched Respondents  
Matched Respondents 
Who Reported 
Turnout 
2012 54,535 42,158 32,846 
2014 56,200 38,392 29,424 
Weighted total of 2012 and 2014 CCES respondents, Catalist matched respondents, and matched 
respondents who reported they “definitely voted” in the General Election.  
 
The vote self-report question is the second question presented to participants in 
the CCES post-election survey right after being asked whether they are registered to vote 
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or not, which is a prerequisite for being presented with the vote self-report question.19 
Respondents who gave the same response to the same vote self-report question, but were 
found to be either honest or deceptive in their answer are the best comparison groups for 
the analysis of response latencies and the detection of intentionality in deceptive answers. 
Honest nonvoters are not included in this analysis because question construction has been 
found to affect response latencies (Yan & Tourangeau, 2007; Mayerl, 2013). The CCES 
uses similar question wording could increase the cognitive load of reporting non-
participation because honest nonvoters must choose between four alternatives, while 
those who choose to report participation have only one alternative to do so (See Image 
4.1). Here in lies the logic for keeping only respondents who self-reported turning out to 
vote. 
Image 4.1 
CCES Vote Self-Report Question Wording 
 
                                                
19 Though studies have found that overreporting also occurs in relation to voter registration (Fullerton, 
Dixon & Borch, 2007) this topic is outside the scope of this current research. In total, 88% of 2012 CCES 
post-election participants reported being registered to vote and 94% in 2014, while only 85% and 92% had 
validated records of voter registration. 
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Having described the subjects included in this analysis I turn to the description of 
the data used to measure response times associate with the vote self-report question. 
Since the CCES is an online survey, part of the available data is the measurement of the 
time it takes for each individual to answer the survey. Every question or group of 
questions in the CCES pre-election and post election questionnaires has a unique page 
within the online survey. YouGov, the polling firm that administers the CCES survey, 
tracks how much time it takes for each respondent to move from one question to the next 
in seconds and milliseconds. In essence, page timing data is measuring the period during 
which the survey question becomes visible to the respondent, the respondent reads the 
question, formulates an answer, makes a report and then moves on to the rest of the 
survey. These page timing measures are unobtrusive to the respondent because it is a 
feature embedded into the online survey instrument and respondents are unaware it is 
happening. 
It is noteworthy that respondents to the CCES self-administer the survey and have 
no limits to the length of time they can take to answer the full survey. What’s more, 
Schaffner and Ansolabehere (2015) in their study of distractions during survey 
administration found that 45% of respondents in the CCES 2010-2014 Panel Study said 
they engaged in activities like doing chores, taking a break, dealing with children, and 
talking on the phone, among others. As a result, there certainly are outliers having 
extremely long response latencies within the page timing data of the CCES. They also 
find that these frequent distractions and interruptions during the completion of the survey 
do not affect the quality of the data collected by the CCES. However, latencies of 
minutes, hours or even days cannot be used as valid measurements of cognitive effort for 
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single answer questions in surveys. Consequently, I implement trimming of page timings 
to create a more accurate assessment of respondents’ thought process when answering the 
vote self-report question (Ratcliff, 1993). 
Table 4.2 CCES Vote Self-Report, Placebo and Baseline Page Timings 
CCES Vote Self-Report Timing 
Placebo/Party Id 
Timing Baseline Timing 
2012 
Mean 9.270s 5.218s 6.782s 
Min. 0.658s 0.678s 2.076s 
Max. 24.601s 15.489s 15.488s 
2014 
Mean 9.682s 4.620s 6.925s 
Min. 0.292s 0.551s 1.688s 
Max. 27.920s 14.161s 16.299s 
Weighted mean for three (3) page timing measures: vote self-report timing, party identification timing, 
and baseline timing in the 2012 and 2014 CCES for respondents who said they “definitely voted in 
2012 and 2014. Baseline is the calculated average timing from items presented in Table 2. 
 
The vote self-report question has its own unique page in the survey, meaning the 
page timing data for this question measures response latencies for this question alone. 
Trimming strengthens the validity of any inference made regarding the connection 
between response latencies and intentionality of deceptive answers (Fazio, 1990; Ratcliff, 
1993; Mayerl, 2013). I trim the dependent variable, the vote self-report page timing, by 
eliminating all values above the 95th percentile.20 This page timing measure has a mean 
of 9.270s and 9.682s, in 2012 and in 2014 respectively (See Table 4.2). Before trimming, 
the vote self-report page timing had a mean of 15.680s in 2012 and a mean of 23.692s in 
2014. The first column of plots from the left in Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of 
observations for the vote self-report timing after trimming and includes a reference line 
indicating the mean timing for this question. The plot reveals higher frequencies around 
                                                
20 Total trimmed = 1,411 observations in the 2012 CCES and 1,039 observations in the 2014 CCES.  
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the 6 second mark for reporting turnout with fewer observations the higher the response 
timing becomes.  
According to the social psychology literature, the ideal design for the analysis of 
response latencies includes a control measure of baseline response speed (Fazio, 1990; 
Mayerl et al., 2005; Mayerl, 2013). This baseline is commonly operationalized as the 
calculated mean of response latencies of filler questions, meaning questions unrelated to 
the item of interest. Baseline response timing “controls for a wide range of disturbing 
factors”, like age and question construction, and is necessary for the proper interpretation 
of response latencies “as a proxy measurement of mental processes” (Mayerl, 2013: p. 4). 
This measure on its own shows us how long it typically takes each individual in the study 
to answer questions of similar construction to that of the item of interest, in this case 
questions similar to that of the vote self-report. But in statistical modeling, including 
baseline timing as a control allows for the detection of differences in response times to 
the turnout question controlling for typical individual response latencies. 
Table 4.3 CCES Questions Used to Create Baseline Timing 
Question 2012  Mean Timing 
2014  
Mean Timing 
All things considered, do you think it was a mistake 
to invade Iraq? 7.263s 8.491s 
Would you say that OVER THE PAST YEAR the 
nation’s economy has...? 8.409s 9.470s 
Did a candidate or political campaign organization 
contact you during the 2010 election? 6.854s 7.233s 
Have you ever run for elective office at any level of 
government (local, state, or federal)? 5.204s 5.421s 
CCES question wording for page timings used in the baseline timing measure and weighted mean 
timing (after trimming) for respondents who were matched to the Catalist voter file and said they 
“definitely voted” in 2012 and 2014. 
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Table 4.4 Reported Voters by Week of Survey Administration 
Week of Survey Administration 2012 CCES 2014 CCES 
1 7,048 22% 
11,417 
39% 
2 19,349 59% 
10,483 
36% 
3 4,183 13% 
3,794 
13% 
4 1,938 6% 
3,514 
12% 
5 328 1% 
216 
0% 
Total 
Reported Turnout 
32,846 
100% 
29,424 
100% 
Weighted total of matched respondents who said the “definitely voted” by time elapsed for the day 
after Election Day measured in weeks (7 days).  
 
I use the mean of page timings for four single-answer questions with similar 
construction to that of the vote self-report question, two from the pre-election and two 
from the post-election questionnaires in both CCES surveys (See Table 4.3). I apply the 
same trimming technique I used with the dependent variable, vote self-report timing, to 
the individual times included in the baseline timing by eliminating all observations above 
the 95th percentile. Since the CCES allows respondents to skip through questions some 
of the times included in the baseline timing have values of zero seconds. These values of 
zeroes seconds represent non responses which I also trim from the individual items 
included in the baseline. Trimming creates a total of 6,797 missing observations in the 
2012 CCES model, and 3,714 missing observations result from trimming the times in the 
baseline for the 2014 CCES model. The mean of the baseline timing for 2012 CCES 
respondents who answered the vote self-report question is 6.782s and 7.654s for those in 
the 2014 CCES (See Table 4.3). The distribution of observations for the baseline has a 
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similar shape to that of the vote self-report timing, however, higher frequencies are found 
closer to the mean when compared to the distribution of the vote self-report timing (See 
Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 
CCES Page Timing Distribution of Vote Self-Report, Placebo and Baseline 
As I mention above the CCES is conducted in close proximity to Election Day, 
suggesting that it is unlikely that respondents forget whether they went out to vote or not. 
Still, vote validation studies have found that memory is a cognitive factor in the incidence 
of overreporting in survey (Belli, Traugott & Beckman, 1999; Belli & Traugott, 2001; 
Belli et al. 2006), which demonstrates that time elapsed between the election and the 
moment of survey administration may affect response latencies for the vote self-report 
question. The post-election wave started to be administered to respondents the day after 
the General Election, November 7th in 2012 and November 5th in 2014. Using the date 
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in which respondents started post-election wave I determined whether respondents who 
said they “definitely voted” answered the question in within the five (5) weeks following 
the election to measure time distance from the election. The variable indicates whether 
respondents started to respond to the post-election questionnaire in the 1st week after the 
election or the 2nd week and so forth until the 5th week after the election. I use the start 
date of the post-election wave of the CCES because the turnout self-report question is the 
second item in the questionnaire. Additionally, trimming of extreme values from the page 
timings of the turnout self-report question increases the certainty that this question was 
answered during week for which it is coded. Table 4.4 shows that the bulk of self-
reported voters started to respond to the CCES question in the first two weeks of the 
election. Though “week of administration” may not affect those who participated early on 
it might significantly affect response latencies for those who participated later on.  
Table 4.5. CCES Voters and Over-reporters among Reported Voters 
 2012 CCES 2014 CCES 
Total Respondents Who 
Reported Turning Out to Vote 
32,846 
100% 
29,424 
100% 
Validated Voters 28,852 88% 
25,739 
87.5% 
Over-reporters 
(Validated Nonvoters) 
3,994 
12% 
3,685 
12.5% 
Weighted total and percentage of 2012 and 2014 CCES respondents who were matched to the Catalist 
voter file and reported they “definitely voted” in the either the 2012 or 2014 General Election by vote 
validation status. 
 
The OLS regression models in the following section include only four variables, 
three of which I have described in detail above. The dependent variable of interest is the 
vote self-report page timing or response latency, the control variable in the model is the 
baseline page timing, and the variable for week of survey administration measures the 
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effect of memory. The independent variable is a dummy that distinguishes between self-
reported voters who actually went out to vote, validated voters, and those who did not, 
over-reporters. Self-reported voters who are validated voters were given a value of zero 
(0) and self-reported voters who are validated nonvoters or over-reporters were given a 
value of one (1). A great majority of those who reported voting in the both 2012 and 2014 
are validated voters, meaning most of those who said they voted when answering the 
CCES actually voted. However, in 2012 12% of those who said they definitely voted are 
validated nonvoters and 12.5% in 2014; that is, 3,994 respondents overreported turnout in 
the 2012 CCES and 3,685 in 2014 CCES (See Table 4.5).  
Results 
Table 4.6 2012 CCES OLS Model for Vote Self-Report and Placebo Timing  by 
Overreporting 
2012 Vote Self-Report Response Timing 
Party ID 
Response Timing 
Overreporting 0.325*** (0.118) 
-0.212*** 
(0.0579) 
Week of Admin. 0.0177 (0.0362) 
0.0340 
(0.0219) 
Baseline Response Timing 1.037*** (0.0198) 
0.502*** 
(0.0119) 
Constant 1.909*** (0.143) 
1.629*** 
(0.0921) 
Observations 26,737 26,410 
R-squared 0.320 0.214 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the results of OLS regression modeling to test whether 
response latencies for vote self-report question are significantly longer when delivered by 
over-reporters than when delivered by validated voters. Overreporting turnout out in the 
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both the 2012 and 2014 General Election results in a significant increase in the length of 
response latencies for the vote self-report question; that is, overreporting turnout involves 
a significantly increased level of cognitive effort than honest reports of turnout. Moving 
from honest reports of turnout to false reports results in an increase of 0.325 seconds in 
2012 and 0.733 seconds in 2014, or between approximately 3 tenths and 7 tenths of a 
second in the length of response latencies of self-reported turnout controlling for baseline 
timing and week of survey administration (See Tables 4.6 and 4.7). This effect is 
comparable to results found in the literature on lie detection where most studies reported 
average response latency increases of between 0.20s and 1s for deceptive answers in 
experimental settings. With a mean response latency of 9.270s for the vote self-report 
question in 2012 (See Table 4.1), overreporting turnout would increase that timing to 
9.325s; and with a mean of 9.682s in 2014 overreporting turnout would increase that 
timing to 10.415s, a substantial increase.21 
The significant positive relationship between overreporting and its corresponding 
response latencies suggests that overreports are in fact deceptive responses because 
falsely reporting participation requires higher cognitive effort than honest reports. 
Response latencies are also helpful in determining intentionality in overreporting. Social 
psychology studies of deception show that deceptive responses require more cognitive 
effort than honest responses then leading to longer response times; however, self-
deceptive responses have shorter response latencies and look more like honest answers. 
Consequently, the finding that overreports cause a significant increase in response 
                                                
21 Please note that the response latencies or page timings in the CCES include the complete process of 
reading the survey question and providing an answer while most of the cited experiments only include the 
latency recorded after being read the question. For this reason, response latencies in this current study will 
be noticeable longer that those in past studies. 
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latencies of turnout self-reports suggests that nonvoters who overreport do so 
intentionally.  
Table 4.7 2014 CCES OLS Model for Vote Self-Report and Placebo Timing  by 
Overreporting 
2014 Vote Self-Report Response Timing 
Party ID 
Response Timing 
Overreporting 0.733*** (0.121) 
-0.115* 
(0.0659) 
Week of Admin. 0.102*** (0.0343) 
0.0379* 
(0.0221) 
Baseline Response Timing 0.979*** (0.0199) 
0.429*** 
(0.00961) 
Constant 2.302*** (0.154) 
1.486*** 
(0.0857) 
Observations 21,320 20,925 
R-squared 0.266 0.218 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The fact that overreports provide false information to researcher is a well known 
problem in survey administration, but this new piece of evidence uncovers the 
mechanism through which respondents engage in overreporting. Nonvoters who 
overreport decide to present themselves as voters by lying about their actual voting 
behavior; they are not forgetful or falsely believe that they went out to vote when they did 
not. If overreports were the result of unconscious self-deception there would be no 
significant difference between the response latencies of voter and nonvoters who reported 
turnout, yet this is not the case.  
Some might argue that respondents who overreport turnout could be significantly 
different from actual voters and that they might take longer to answer all questions in 
surveys. Though baseline timing should be sufficient to control for timing differences 
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across individuals, I include a placebo test that measures the effect of being an over-
reporter on the page timing for the party identification question. This question is part of 
the post-election questionnaire administered to subjects in the CCES and comes shortly 
after the vote self-report question. It is a single answer question with multiple 
alternatives, but differs from the vote self-report question in that overreporting should be 
unrelated to the response timing for this question.  
I applied trimming to the party identification question page timing by eliminating 
all values above the 95th percentile, in the same manner that I trimmed extreme values 
from the response latencies of vote self-report question. The party identification timing 
has a mean of 5.218 in 2012 and 4.620s in 2014 after trimming (See Table 4.1). The 
distribution of observations for this page timing is plotted in Figure 4.1, most 
observations can be found around the 3 second mark. Using OLS regression to measure 
the effect of being an over-reporter on the placebo timing while controlling for baseline 
timing and week of survey shows that overreporting does not result in longer response 
latencies associated with the party identification question. In fact, over-reporters take 
significantly less time to report their party identification when compared to validated 
voters by 0.212s in 2012 and by 0.115s in 2014 (See Tables 4.6 and 4.7).  
The placebo test is a good indicator of validity of the results found in the initial 
model because overreporting affects the response latencies of the vote self-report 
question, but does not affect the response latencies of the party identification question. A 
greater amount of cognitive effort was expended by over-reporters when delivering false 
turnout self-reports than when stating their partisanship. Evidently those who overreport 
have little trouble stating their party identity, but think more about what response to 
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giving a false response about their participation in elections. The negative relationship 
between overreporting and the response latencies for party identification demonstrates 
that these respondents are using information readily available in their minds. In contrast, 
the positive relationship between overreporting and turnout response latencies show that 
nonvoters who overreport choose not use the information most readily available in 
memory to then give survey researchers a deceptive answer. 
The placebo model demonstrated that overreporting is unrelated to the page 
timings of the party identification question, but the variable measure week of survey 
administration had differing results for the 2012 and 2014 CCES models. In 2012, the 
time elapsed between Election Day and the week of interview did not have a significant 
effect on increasing the length of remorse latencies for the vote self-report question while 
it had a highly significant positive effect 2014. Though week of administration 
significantly increased response latencies in 2014 the size of the effect, 0.102s or one 
tenth of a second, was not greater than that of overreporting, 0.733s or seven tenths of a 
second. Thus, overreporting is the main source of heightened cognitive effort in self-
reports of voter turnout, measured in the form of response latencies, not memory lapses 
resulting from time of interview. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I explore the deceptive nature of overreporting to better understand 
the cognitive mechanism through which turnout overreports occur in process of survey 
administration. As discussed, overreporting electoral participation in surveys is thought to 
be caused mostly by socially desirable responding (SDR) and memory failure. SDR, as a 
form of response bias, causes individuals to provide inaccurate self-reports that manifest 
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in two types of deception. Those are self-deception and other-deception. These two forms 
of SDR differ mainly in whether the respondent consciously or unconsciously delivers a 
deceptive response to a survey question. Vote validation scholars who have attributed 
overreporting to social desirability bias have failed to explore the implications of this 
claim, while the merits of memory failure have been well documented.  
The first implication of the social desirability assumption is that overreports are 
deceptive responses, and the second is that overreports might be either self-deceptive or 
other-deceptive. I use response latencies to address these implications to demonstrate that 
overreports are responses born from deception and to determine the intentionality of false 
reports of turnout. Social psychology studies of deception and lie detection show that 
deceptive responses require more cognitive effort than honest responses, that cognitive 
effort can be measured using response latencies, and that honest responses on average 
have shorter response latencies that deceptive ones. Furthermore, self-deceptive 
responses have been found to have similar response latencies to those of honest 
responses, that is, they are not intentional.  
I find that overreporting turnout significantly increases the length of response 
latencies associated with the vote self-reports question controlling for baseline timing and 
time elapsed from the election, as week of interview. My findings support the widely held 
assumption that overreports of voter turnout are the result of socially desirable 
responding because lengthier response latencies are related to greater cognitive effort in 
deceptive answers. Greater cognitive effort in overreporting leads me to conclude that 
overreports are deception. Also, OLS modeling shows that overreporting requires a 
substantially and significantly more cognitive effort than truthful reports of turnout, 
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demonstrating that the one involves intentional deception while the other involves simply 
reporting facts stored in memory. This gives credence to my second argument, that 
turnout overreports are equivalent to an impression management type of SDR. If 
overreports were self-deception there would be no significant difference between the 
response latencies for honest and false reports of voting, this is not the case. Over-
reporters are engaging in conscious other-deception when they falsely report turning out 
to vote. 
The knowledge generated in this chapter and in the preceding chapters are the 
foundation for the concluding chapter that follows. Having presented evidence in 
chapters 2 and 3 that over-reporters are sufficiently different from voters in particular I 
address the bias that overreports bring to statistical modeling of turnout.  
 
CHAPTER 5 
OVERRPORT BIAS IN TURNOUT MODELS  
Throughout this dissertation I have presented an accumulation of evidence to 
show that overreports of voter turnout can bias statistical models of turnout. I did so by 
discussing the distribution of demographic, social and political characteristics among 
over-reporters in comparison with the distribution of those same characteristics among 
validated voters and honest nonvoters. Distributions for over-reporters were distinct from 
those for validated voters and nonvoters, with a trend toward similarities with validated 
voters. Additional evidence was presented through the discussion of the observed 
statistical relationship between overreporting and traditional predictors of turnout that 
resulted from a multinomial logistic model. The relationships between overreporting and 
predictors of turnout resembled those of nonvoting and predictors of turnout. Then, I 
showed that overreports were associated with lengthier response latencies for the turnout 
self-report question, which led to the conclusion that overreports occur due to intentional 
deception because of social desirability considerations. This suggests that survey 
researchers should be skeptical of self-reports of voter turnout. Furthermore, political 
scientists should continue to work towards creating new methods to reduce the incidence 
of overreporting and to correct for overreport bias in the study of turnout.  
By way of conclusion, in this final chapter, I compare turnout models for the 2014 
and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) to showcase the 
discrepancies between models that use self-reported turnout as their dependent variable 
and models that use validated turnout. Discrepancies regarding the size of the statistical 
relationship between predictors and both dependent variables will produce my final 
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points evidence in response to the vote validation literature’s debate on whether 
overreports bias models of turnout. I also present a possible method of correcting for 
overreport bias that is rooted in the social desirability theory of overreporting that is at 
the center of this dissertation. Using 2016 CCES UMass Module data I show how a six 
item version of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) could help 
respond to whether overreports are akin to a self-deception type of socially desirable 
responding (SDR) or an impression management (other-deception) type of SDR. 
Self-Reported Turnout Versus Validated Turnout 
The study of voter turnout in American politics relies almost completely on self-
reports of (non)participation in elections collected from survey research. Self-reports of 
turnout are problematic because a considerable proportion of survey respondents falsely 
report turning out to vote. Overreports interfere with the accurate measurement of 
participation in elections and the assessment of what can be done to increase and expand 
democratic political participation. This interference is reflected in the overestimation of 
turnout rates in surveys and in biased coefficients of turnout models, as I will 
demonstrate in this section. 
Past vote validation research has engaged in similar comparison of turnout models 
as the comparison carried out in this chapter. Two studies conclude that overreports do 
not bias conclusions about which factors are the most important predictors of turnout and 
two additional studies conclude the opposite. Using 1978 ANES data Katosh and 
Traugott (1981) find no major changes in the relationship between independent variables 
and turnout when using validated turnout instead of self-reported turnout. As a 
consequence, they state that political science has not “suffered a catastrophic loss of any 
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of the substantial body of knowledge about voting behavior” (1982: p. 534). In agreement 
with this study, using 1976 ANES data, Sigelman (1982) finds no great differences 
between models fitted using self-reported turnout and validated turnout, and touts the 
results as “very good news for students of voting” (p. 55). Still, more recent studies take 
an opposing view (Bernstein, Chadha & Montjoy, 2001; Cassel, 2003). Bernstein et al. 
(2001) show that overreporting matters and “distorts standard explanations of voting, 
increasing the apparent importance of independent variables that are related in the same 
direction to both overreporting and voting, while sharply decreasing the apparent 
importance of independent variables related in opposing directions to those two 
variables” (p. 41). In her 2003 study, Cassel compared logistic regressions of self-
reported and validated turnout models for 1984 to 1988 presidential elections using 
ANES data. She concludes that overreports “bias the effect of one in five independent 
variables in a presidential turnout equation and one in four in a midterm one” (p. 88) 
either by depressing or inflating their effect. Furthermore, Cassel instructs turnout 
scholars to forewarn their readers about possible overreport bias in their studies when 
using any of the identified variables with depressed or inflated effects.22 
In order to illustrate how overreports can bias statistical models of turnout I carry 
out logistic regression modeling for self-reported turnout and validated turnout in the 
2014 and 2012 CCES. Self-reported turnout is defined here as all matched CCES 
respondents who selected “I definitely voted in the General Election on November #” as 
their response to the turnout question in the post election wave of the survey; all other 
                                                
22 “Studies of self-reported voting participation that include one or more of these independent variables or 
other untested independent variables should inform readers how overreporting bias affects, or may affect, 
their conclusions” (p. 89). 
  97 
respondents who reported nonparticipation and those who reported being non-registered 
are self-reported nonvoters. Validated turnout includes all post election CCES 
respondents with a confirmed record of voting from Catalist, self-reported nonvoters who 
were not matched to Catalist and all respondents with a confirmed record of 
nonparticipation. The values for self-reported voters do not include unmatched self-
reported voters. Table 5.1 shows totals and percentage of self-reported voters and 
validated voters in the 2014 and 2012 CCES along with the total and percentage of the 
discrepancy between these two groups, namely overreports. 
Table 5.1 Self-Reported and Validated Turnout in the 2014 and 2012 CCES 
 Self-Reported Turnout Validated Turnout Overreport Rate 
2014 30,417 75% 
26,648 
66% 
3,769 
9% 
2012 34,127 83% 
30,050 
73% 
4,077 
10% 
Columns show the weighted percent of self-reported and validated turnout among post election 
respondents, and the difference between these quantities for the 2014 and 2012 CCES studies. 
 
I use ten independent variables that are traditional predictors of voter turnout in 
the self-reported turnout models and validated turnout models. 23 These include three 
demographic variables, a continuous variable for age, a dummy variable for gender where 
female is the indicator, and another dummy variable for race where the indicator is being 
non-white. Age is a consistent predictor of participation in election, the older the 
individual the more likely to participate (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Brady & 
Schlozman, 1995). I include female gender as a predictor because in the past women 
were les politically active, but now they are as active or more active than men (Leighley 
                                                
23 Marital status is excluded from the analysis in this chapter because results in Chapter 3 show that this is 
not a significant predictor for validated turnout, nonvoting or overreporting. 
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& Nagler, 2014). Non-white race is a particularly important addition because non-whites 
tend to participate at lower rates (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Brady & 
Schlozman, 1995), but they also tend to be more likely to overreport turnout, particularly 
Black Americans (Silver & Anderson 1986; Abramson & Claggett, 1992). Two variables 
measure socioeconomic status; a measure of family income with sixteen categories 
staring with “less than $10,000” and ending in “$500,000 or more,” and a six category 
measure of education that has “no high school” as its lowest value and “post-grad” as its 
highest. Two additional variables measure social connectedness, a homeownership 
dummy and a six category variable measuring the frequency of a respondent’s church 
attendance. Education, family income, homeownership and church attendance are integral 
factors to resource models of turnout and has been found to predict participation (Verba, 
Brady & Schlozman, 1995).  
Finally, four variables measure political characteristics. These include two 
indicator variables, one that measures strong partisanship, and another that measures 
campaign contact. Also, two variables that measure political engagement, these are: a 
four category measure of interest in politics, and a count variable that represents political 
knowledge with seven values. Individuals with strong party identity are general more 
invested in the outcome of an election and will be motivated to participate. External 
mobilization efforts like campaign contact have also proven to mobilize voters to the 
polls (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Gerber & Green, 2015). High levels of political 
interest have consistently predicted political engagement in voting (Verba, Brady & 
Schlozman, 1995), and so have high levels of political knowledge (Galston, 2001). All 
variables were standardized to a zero to one scale and models within each year were 
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estimated on the same sample. 
Figure 5.1 
Logit Model Coefficient Plots of Validated Turnout and 
Self-Reported Turnout in the 2014 and 2012 CCES 
 
 
Findings in the studies conducted by Bernstein et al. (2001) and Cassel (2003) 
allow me to set expectation for the comparison of logistic regressions for self-reported 
turnout and validated turnout in the CCES. Previous research found no significant 
difference in the effect of age on self-reported and validated turnout. Still, results from 
Chapter 3 show a strong relationship between age and validated turnout, but not with 
overreporting, which could depress the effect of age on self-reported turnout. I expect a 
significantly larger effect of age on validated turnout than on self-reported turnout. 
Female gender should have a positive but non significant effect on turnout. Non-white 
race should have a larger negative effect on validated turnout than on self-reported 
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Note: Plots show estimated logit coefficients with 95% coefficients intervals from two logistic regression models of turnout in both the 2014
and 2012 CCES, these are a self-reported turnout model and a validated turnout model.
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turnout. The importance of education should be overestimated in the self-reported turnout 
model, but the coefficient should not be significantly different. I also expect a large 
difference in the effect of family income, homeownership and church attendance on 
turnout, where the effect will be inflated in the self-reported turnout model. The effect of 
all four political variables should be inflated in the self-reported turnout model, 
particularly political interest and political knowledge.  
Figure 5.1 plots logistic regression coefficients estimated in the self-reported and 
validated turnout models for the 2014 and 2012 CCES. The data points of the validated 
turnout models show that using self-reported turnout results in both the overestimation 
and underestimation of the effect of multiple variables on turnout. Eight variables in the 
2014 CCES show a substantial shift in the size and significance of their effect on 
predicting participation in the validated turnout model when compared to the self-
reported turnout model. The logit coefficient for age is significantly larger in the 
validated turnout model by 0.59 decimal points. The impact of age on participation was 
depressed in the self-reported turnout model. Similarly, the negative effect of non-white 
race was also depressed in the self-reported turnout model by 0.21 decimal points. There 
is a marked difference in the effect of family income on self-reported turnout and 
validated turnout. Family income has a positive and significant effect on predicting 
participation in the self-reported turnout model, but it is not a significant predictor in the 
validated turnout model. The same is true for church attendance. In the self-reported 
turnout model being female has a negative and significant effect on participation. 
However, the validated turnout model shows that gender does not make a person more or 
less likely to participate. Additionally, the positive impact of homeownership, partisan 
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strength, interest in politics was inflated in the self-reported turnout model, where the size 
of the effect of these variables on validated turnout is significantly smaller. These results 
show an underestimation of the effect age and non-white race, and an overestimation of 
the effect of female gender, family income, homeownership, church attendance, partisan 
strength, and interest in politics in the self-reported turnout model. 
Six variables in the 2012 CCES show notable changes in the size and significance 
of their effect in the validated turnout model when compared to the self-reported turnout 
model. Female gender has a positive and significant effect on validated turnout, while it 
was non significant for self-reported turnout thought he difference in the size of the 
coefficient is not significant. Similarly, the effect of non-white race changed from being 
positive and non significant to negative and significant. The positive effect of four 
variables on electoral participation show substantial shifts in the size of their effects in 
the self-reported turnout model and the validated turnout model. Family income, strong 
partisanship, interest in politics, and political knowledge have significantly larger 
coefficients in the self-reported turnout model than in the validated turnout model. These 
results show an underestimation of of the effect of female gender and non-white race and 
an overestimation of the impact of family income, strong partisanship, interest in politics 
and political knowledge on increasing the likelihood of participating in electoral events 
when the participation is measured with self-reported turnout (See Appendix B for 
regression Tables B.3 & B.4). 
The results from comparing turnout models in both 2014 and 2012 show a 
consistent underestimation of the importance of age in predicting electoral participation, 
particularly in 2014. The negative effect of non-white race was consistently 
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underestimated in both survey years, while the effect of female gender was also 
misestimated. There is also a consistent overestimation of the predictive power of family 
income, strong partisanship, and political interest. For the most part, the coefficients in 
each model follow a similar pattern, but there are marked discrepancies in the level of 
statistical significance and the size of the effect that traditional predictors of electoral 
participation had on self-reported turnout and validated turnout. The results presented in 
this section show that overreports do bias statistical models of turnout that are based on 
self-reported turnout. Overreports lead to both overestimation and underestimation of the 
impact of demographic, social and political factors on predicting turnout. More 
importantly, the fact that the discrepancies are most remarkable among political factors 
adds to the evidence already presented throughout this dissertation to support the notion 
that overreports are associated with socially desirable responding. Furthermore, this 
reinforces the claim that social desirability bias is related to overreports because survey 
respondents who recognize that there is a social meaning of voting provide responses that 
give the impression of conforming to the democratic norm of participation. 
Self-Reported Turnout and Social Desirability 
In this section I present correlational analysis using Delroy L. Paulhus’s (1991) 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) to identify statistical relationship 
between self-reports of turnout and socially desirable responding. In the first chapter of 
this dissertation I explain how vote validation scholarship, for the most part, has assumed 
that social desirability bias is at play in the occurrence of voter turnout overreports. Very 
few scholars test this assumption, and those who do so use the same method, the item 
count technique (ICT) or list experiment (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010; Comsa & 
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Postelnicu, 2013). The use of the ICT provides a strong signal that social desirability and 
overreports are related, but it does not allow for a more nuanced understanding of how 
overreporting is related to the complex construct that is SDR. 
SDR is a form of response bias that “refers to the systematic tendency to give 
overly positive answers that make the respondent look good” (Bobio & Manganelli, 
2011: p. 117). Two typologies dominate the literature on SDR and are typically used to 
measure and theorize this form of response bias, these are: self-deception and impression 
management (other-deception). Self-deception “refers to an unconscious tendency to 
provide honest but positively biased self-reports with the aim of protecting positive self-
esteem; it is a predisposition to see oneself in a favorable light…” (p.118). Impression 
management “refers to the habitual and conscious presentation of a favorable public 
image” (Bobio & Manganelli, 2011: p. 118), and “signifies a tendency to give inflated 
self-descriptions to an audience: a conscious dissimulation of responses to create a 
socially desirable image” (Hart et al., 2015: p. 2). Both types of SDR are forms 
deception, but differ in who is targeted by the deception. The first has the purpose of 
enhancing one’s self-image while the second has the purpose of enhancing one’s social 
image.  
The BIDR was created to measure and control for SDR in statistical analysis of 
data collected from self-report studies. The BIDR is a 40-item instrument developed to 
assess individual differences in SDR, and for this purpose it includes a Self-Deception 
Scale (20-itmes) and an Impression Management Scale (20-items) (Paulhus, 1991). The 
BIDR is typically administered to respondents as a form with a list of 40 statements, and 
respondents are asked to give each statement a number value from 1 to 7 to indicate how 
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true the statement is. Though this instrument allows for the measurement of both 
dimensions of SDR its length is not practical for surveys that have time constraints. For 
this reason, Hart et al. (2015) conducted research to develop and test a short version of 
the BIDR that reduces the original 40-item questionnaire to a 16-item instrument that can 
be used more widely in survey research. I took this exercise further by conducting a pilot 
study in June of 2016 that included the16-item version of the BIDR developed by Hart 
and colleagues in order to identify six items that could efficiently measure the underlying 
constructs assessed in both the Self-Deception (SD) Scale and the (IM) Impression 
Management Scale (See Appendix D for a report on the pilot study and the factor 
analysis employed to select the BIDR items used here).  
The scales within the BIDR have been used to identify SDR in many studies of 
self-reports. Randal and Fernandes (1991) used the BIDR in correlational analysis of self-
reports of ethnical behavior finding higher correlations with the IM Scale than with the 
SD Scale. Another example of the use of the BIDR is a study conducted to identify SDR 
in sexuality self-reports, where self-reports of interpersonal sexual behavior and 
intrapersonal sexual behavior were highly correlated with the IM Scale, while sexual 
orientation was not correlated with either scales in the BIDR (Meston, Hieman, Trapnell 
and Paulhus, 1998), Furthermore, using the BIDR social psychologists have found that 
many types of behavioral and attitudinal self-reports in online and computer based 
surveys are correlated to both the IM Scale and SD Scale (Booth-Kewley et al., 1992; 
Risko, Quilty & Oakman, 2006; Booth-Kewley et al., 2007) . 
In this dissertation, particularly chapters 1 and 4, I articulate a social desirability 
theory of overreporting where I argue that overreports are evidence of SDR in self-
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reports of turnout, that they are deception or falsehoods about voting, and that they must 
be equivalent to an impression management type of SDR, not self-deception. I argue that 
overreports are impression management because of they respond to the need to generate a 
positive social image and because voting is a social act that has an uncontested social 
meaning (Rolfe, 2012). The best test for this theory would be to conduct correlational 
analysis in a multinomial logit model between overreporting and the BIDR scales, 
however this is not possible because the 2016 CCES has not been validated at this time  
The University of Massachusetts Amherst Department of Political Science 
purchased one CCES module in the 2016 CCES with 2,500 respondents and shared 
survey time with a second UMass module with a sample of 1,000 respondents for a total 
sample of 3,500 participants. A great majority of the combined UMass Module 
participants completed the post election wave questionnaire, a total 2,757 respondents 
(79%); this is where respondents report registration and (non)participation in the election 
under study. Almost all post election respondents reported their registration status and 
turnout; only 5 post election respondents did not report either. Eighty-three percent of 
post election respondents self-reported that they definitely went out to vote on November 
8, 2016. Nonvoters are comprised of all self-reported non-registered respondents and 
self-reported nonvoters for a total 18% (See Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Self-Reported Turnout in the 2016 CCES UMass Module 
Total 2,752 
Voter 2,271 83% 
Nonvoter 481 18% 
Quantities show the weighted total of post election respondents and the total and percentage of self-
reported voters and nonvoters in the 2016 CCES UMass Module.  
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Table 5.3 Six Item BIDR in the 2016 CCES UMass Module 
Instructions: 
On a scale of Not True to Completely True indicate how each of these statements best describes you. 
SD Scale 
1. Its hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.  
2. I’m very confident in my judgments.  
3. I am a completely rational person.  
IM Scale 
4. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of 
someone.  
5. I have said something bad about a friend behind their back.  
6. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.  
Table shows wording for the six BIDR items included in the 2016 CCES UMass Module and indicates 
the three items that measured self-deception and the three items that measured impression 
management. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 
Frequency Histograms for the Self-Deception and Impression Management Scales 
in the Post Election 2016 CCES UMass Module 
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I included six BIDR items in the 2016 CCES UMass Amherst Module, three 
items served as a mini SD Scale and another three items served as a mini IM Scale. The 
six items or statements were presented to CCES respondents on one questionnaire page 
on the online survey. Next to each item there was a seven-point scale where respondents 
were asked to indicate how each of the statements best described them, where “not true” 
had a value of one (1) and “completely true” had a value of seven (7) (See Table 5.3 for 
item wording). The scores for items 1, 4, 5 and 6 listed in Table 5.4 are negatively keyed 
items. These items require reversing their values before employing the continuous 
scoring procedure commonly used in coding the scales within the BIDR. In addition to 
reverse coding the negatively keyed items extreme responses with a value of 6 or 7 had 
one point added. Finally, the three SD Scale items and the three items in the IM Scale 
were summed, averaged and rescaled to a 0 to 1 scale. Though factor analysis could be 
used to generate a variable for the latent construct measured by each scale, the coding 
employed here has been extensively tested for validity and reliability (Li & Bagger, 2007; 
Li & Li, 2008; Bobbio & Manganelli, 2011; Kam, 2013).  
Figure 5.2 shows histograms of the frequency of observations within the SD Scale 
and IM Scale among post election respondents in the 2016 CCES UMass Module. The 
mean value for self-deception is 0.6 and the mean value for impression management is 
0.5. These average values indicate that post election respondents in this survey module 
tend to score high on the construct of self-deception, while the distribution for impression 
management has resembles a normal curve where respondents are mostly grouped around 
the mean value for the IM Scale. 
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Figure 5.3 
Logit Model Coefficient Plots of Self-Reported Turnout by the BIDR 
in the 2016 CCES UMass Module 
 
 
Plot (1) in Figure 5.3 show results for a simple logistic regression for self-reported 
turnout in the 2016 CCES UMass Modules using both BIDR scales as independent 
variables. The coefficient for self-deception has positive and significant effect on 
reporting turnout, while the coefficient for impression management is negative and non 
significant. These results show that those who said they definitely went out to vote on 
November 8 have a tendency towards self-deception. However, as the histogram for the 
SD Scale in Figure 5.2 shows most respondents in the 2016 UMass Modules tend to score 
high on self-deception, and Table 5.2 show that a great majority of respondents in this 
survey module report themselves as voters. These previous findings suggest that these 
results may not retain these values when controlling for other factors. Plot (2) in Figure 
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5.3 presents results for a logistic regression of self-reported turnout by the BIDR scales 
controlling for age, female gender, family income, homeownership, strong partisanship, 
campaign contact, and political knowledge. In this second model both the SD Scales and 
the IM Scale had no significant effect on predicting self-reported voting. I suspect that 
using the full 16-item BIDR could have yielded more conclusive results, and that vote 
validation data could also give a better picture about the relationship between 
overreporting and social desirability bias.  
Conclusion 
The research presented in this dissertation has sought to address the four major 
debates surrounding the vote validation literature: 1) How accurate is vote validation?, 2) 
Do overreports of voter turnout bias statistical models of turnout?, 3) What is the correct 
way to measure and model overreporting?, and 4) What is the cognitive mechanism 
through which overreports occur? 
There are two camps in the debate regarding the accuracy of vote validation. One 
camp argues that vote validation provides an accurate assessment of turnout that uses 
publicly available record. Also, that vote validation procedures for matching survey data 
to voter file records can be performed with rigor and high quality standards 
(Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2010, 2012). The other camp argues against the use of vote 
validation. Those who shares this view claim that voter file matching is not accurate, that 
public registration and turnout records used in the process are not well kept, and that 
validation results in a high rate of misclassification. In the case of Berent et al. (2011, 
2016), the authors argue that the lowered rate of turnout estimated from vote validation 
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only give the illusion of accuracy. It is their view that voter turnout self-reports are more 
trustworthy that validate turnout. 
I share the view of the fist camp, that vote validation is a more accurate 
assessment of voter turnout. In chapters 1 and 2, I describe the Catalist matching 
procedure used to validate the CCES to demonstrate that vote validation in the CCES is 
sound. In that description I show that Catalist has high standards for creating their own 
private file from public records. Catalist purchases registration and voting records from 
all 50 states in the United States multiple times a year in order to keep their records up to 
date. They also clean and standardize their data into a uniform record for all individuals. 
Catalist also complements their vote file data with marketing data to fill in any gaps there 
may be in any individual’s record that might make the matching process more difficult. 
Finally, Catalist uses a proprietary matching algorithm that result in a probability score 
for which they only classify CCES respondents as matched if they have a high probability 
score. 
The debate concerning overreport bias in statistical model of turnout was 
addressed in chapters 2, 3 and in this final chapter. The analysis of descriptive statistics in 
Chapter 2 showed that over-reporters share characteristics with both voters and 
nonvoters. However, over-reporters are also distinctive in that they do not match the 
demographic, social and political characteristics of either voters or nonvoters. Chapter 3 
presented statistical modeling of overreports that compared the effect that traditional 
predictors of turnout had on the probability of becoming an over-reporter, a voter or a 
nonvoter. Using multinomial logit regression, I found that over-reporters occupy a middle 
ground between voters and nonvoters, but that the marginal effects of the predictors on 
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overreporting followed a similar pattern to that or their effect on nonvoting. The findings 
in chapters 2 and 3 lay the foundation for the analysis presented here in Chapter 5, 
because they show that over-reporters are not just like voters and survey researchers 
should expect overreports to bias research on turnout. The comparison of validated and 
self-reported turnout logit models presented at the beginning of this chapter shows that 
overreports do bias statistical models of turnout. Overreports lead to the underestimation 
and overestimation of the impact of that multiple characteristics have on predicting the 
probability of turnout out to vote. 
Measurement and modeling of overreports was addressed in chapters 2 and 3. In 
Chapter 2, I discuss different ways of assessing turnout overestimation in survey research 
and the measurement of overreports at the individual level using vote validation data. I 
present overreport estimations using both a dichotomous and multi category 
measurement, then giving preference to the multi category measurement in order to 
compare over-reporters to voters and nonvoters. I find that the multichotomous 
measurement of overreport provides a more comprehensive and consistent look at this 
phenomenon. In Chapter3, I explain how traditional logit modeling of overreports is not 
ideal because exclusion of voters form the analysis may introduce selection bias. I 
propose that multinomial logit regression modeling is the appropriate approach for 
identifying the key predictors of overreporting, finding that political factors are the most 
impactful in predicting engagement in overreporting. These results fit the social 
desirability theory of overreporting proposed in this dissertation, especially since these 
results from the multinomial logit model suggest that heighted awareness of the 
democratic norm of voting and its social meaning are related to overreporting. 
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I have also engaged in addressing the fourth debate about which is the mental 
process that that occurs when survey respondents overreport. Many vote validation 
scholars an d survey research are engaged in the development of new methods and 
questionnaire wording that might reduce the incidence of overreporting and collect more 
accurate self-report of turnout. However, I propose that it is necessary to identify the 
cognitive mechanism through which overreport occur before creating effective 
techniques that will gather unbiased self-report of political participation. In Chapter 4, I 
test a hypothesis derive from the virtually untested assumption that overreports are 
caused by socially desirable responding. The hypothesis is that if overreports are caused 
by SDR, the overreports are equivalent to deception. Using response latency data and 
methods from the lie detection and deception literature from the discipline of social 
psychology I found that overreports require more cognitive effort than honest reports of 
turnout, even when controlling for the possibility of memory failure. The significant 
statistical relationship between overreports and longer response latencies is evidence that 
over-reporters intentionally lie about their about their non-participation.  
This dissertation is not the final word on the study of voter turnout self-reports, 
vote validation and overreporting. It represents some of the fundamental methodological 
questions that scholars of voter turnout should be engaged with when using survey data in 
their research of democratic participation in elections. More work needs to be done on the 
role of social desirability bias in overreporting, and more techniques need to be 
developed in order to curtail the bias introduced by overreports to the study of turnout. 
Finally, I hope that the work shown here will engender further research on this topic.  
 
APPENDIX A 
COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION STUDY 
CCES 2008: 
The 2008 CCES was conducted online by YouGov/Politmetrix using a matched sample 
design. YouGov/Polimetrix interviewed a nationally representative sample of 32,800 
respondents. The response rate was 47%, having initially contacted 105,895 individuals. 
The Pre-Election wave was conducted between October 8 and November 3, 2008; and the 
Post-Election wave was conducted after the General Election between November 5 and 
December 7, 2008. 
 
Stephen Ansolabehere, 2010, "CCES, Common Content, 2008", hdl:1902.1/14003, 
Harvard Dataverse, V6, UNF:5:7eeaUMPVCcKDNxK6/kd37w== 
 
CCES 2010: 
The 2010 CCES was conducted online by YouGov/Politmetrix using a matched sample 
design. YouGov/Polimetrix interviewed a nationally representative sample of 55,400 
respondents. The response rate was 40% having initially contacted 196,235 individuals. 
The Pre-Election wave was conducted between October 1 and November 1, 2010; and the 
Post-Election wave was conducted after the General Election between November 4 and 
December 7, 2010. 
 
Stephen Ansolabehere, 2012, "CCES Common Content, 2010", hdl:1902.1/17705, 
Harvard Dataverse, V3 
 
CCES 2012: 
The 2012 CCES was conducted online by YouGov using a matched sample design. 
YouGov interviewed a nationally representative sample of 54,535 respondents. The 
response rate was 35% having initially contacted 264,457 individuals. The Pre-Election 
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wave was conducted between October 1 and November 5, 2012; and the Post-Election 
wave was conducted after the General Election between November 7 and December 13, 
2012. 
 
Ansolabehere, Stephen; Schaffner, Brian, 2013, "CCES Common Content, 2012", 
hdl:1902.1/21447, Harvard Dataverse, V8, 
UNF:5:Eg5SQysFZaPiXc8tEbmmRA== 
 
CCES 2014: 
The 2014 CCES was conducted online by YouGov using a matched sample design. 
YouGov/Polimetrix interviewed a nationally representative sample of 56,200 
respondents. The response rate was 40% having initially contacted 196,235 individuals. 
The Pre-Election wave was conducted between October 1 and November 3, 2014; and the 
Post-Election wave was conducted after the General Election between November 5 and 
December 8, 2014. 
Schaffner, Brian; Ansolabehere, Stephen, 2015, "CCES Common Content, 2014", 
doi:10.7910/DVN/XFXJVY, Harvard Dataverse, V3, 
UNF:6:WvvlTX+E+iNraxwbaWNVdg== 
 
CCES 2016 UMass Module: 
The 2016 University of Massachusetts Module was purchased as part of the 2016 CCES. 
Documentation on response rates, and field dates have not been published at this time.  
Ansolabehere, Stephen; Schaffner, Brian F., 2017, "CCES Common Content, 2016", 
doi:10.7910/DVN/GDF6Z0, Harvard Dataverse, V1, 
UNF:6:XRWBSCTbPDuGIDvAN1TOzQ== 
 
Schaffner, COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION STUDY, 2010: University 
of Massachusetts Amherst CONTENT. Release: 2017. Amherst, MA. 
http://cces.gov.harvard.edu  
 
APPENDIX B 
 
ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS TABLES 
 
Table B.1 CCES Respondents by Vote Validation Status and Reported Turnout 
CCES Survey 
Year Total Validated Voters Nonvoters Over-Reporters 
2014 36,688 25,739 70% 
7,265 
20% 
3,685 
10% 
2012 40,616 34,468 85% 
2,143 
5% 
4,005 
10% 
2010 41,090 25,197 69% 
12,269 
30% 
3,623 
9% 
2008 23,528 17,221 73% 
4,058 
17% 
2,250 
10% 
Rows show Catalist matched CCES respondents, excluding Virginians, by validation status and self-
reported turnout. Columns show weighted total and percent by CCES year of validated nonvoters, 
validated nonvoters who honestly reported non-participation and nonvoters who overreported 
turnout. 
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Table B.2 CCES Demographics, Socioeconomic Status and Political Engagement 
CCES Year 2014 2012 
Mean Age 50 50 
% Female 53% 53% 
% Black 11% 9% 
% Hispanic 9% 8% 
% White 77% 78% 
% College 38% 37% 
Median Income $50,000 - $59,999 $40,000 - $49,999 
% Homeowners  65% 63% 
% Married 54% 54% 
% Church Goers 29% 29% 
% Strong Partisans  12% 21% 
% Campaign Contact 53% 63% 
% High Political Interest 53% 51% 
% High Political Knowledge 46% 41% 
% High Political Activity 7% 8% 
Columns show weighted values for all respondents who answered the turnout self-reports question in 
the 2014 and 2012 CCES studies, excluding Virginias and unmatched self-reported voters. 
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Table B.3 
Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting Overreporting in the 2014 CCES 
2014 CCES Logistic Regression Model 
Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 
Validated Turnout Overreport 
Age 0.505*** (0.194) 
2.688*** 
(0.141) 
0.393** 
(0.187) 
Female -0.225*** (0.0729) 
-0.0927* 
(0.0535) 
-0.184*** 
(0.0708) 
Non-White 0.138* (0.0828) 
-0.347*** 
(0.0620) 
0.175** 
(0.0775) 
Family Income 0.135 (0.188) 
0.383*** 
(0.148) 
0.118 
(0.188) 
Education 0.671*** (0.128) 
1.155*** 
(0.0955) 
0.711*** 
(0.123) 
Homeowner 0.268*** (0.0795) 
0.324*** 
(0.0562) 
0.285*** 
(0.0778) 
Married 0.0489 (0.0769) 
-0.0638 
(0.0542) 
0.0340 
(0.0765) 
Church 
Attendance 
0.0853 
(0.113) 
0.236*** 
(0.0758) 
0.254** 
(0.101) 
Strong 
Partisanship 
0.380*** 
(0.143) 
0.504*** 
(0.107) 
0.420*** 
(0.134) 
Campaign 
Contact 
0.209*** 
(0.0756) 
0.812*** 
(0.0507) 
0.235*** 
(0.0724) 
Political 
Interest 
1.592*** 
(0.133) 
1.050*** 
(0.0928) 
1.489*** 
(0.130) 
Political 
Knowledge 
1.158*** 
(0.136) 
2.427*** 
(0.0977) 
1.007*** 
(0.140) 
Political 
Activity 
1.641*** 
(0.211) 
1.043*** 
(0.152) 
1.381*** 
(0.190) 
Constant -3.347*** (0.149) 
-3.303*** 
(0.114) 
-3.271*** 
(0.142) 
Observations 13,990 34,498 34,498 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.4 
Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting Overreporting in the 2012 CEES 
2012 CCES Logistic Regression Model 
Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 
Validated Turnout Overreport 
Age -0.686*** (0.235) 
0.196 
(0.163) 
-0.831*** 
(0.220) 
Female 0.0442 (0.0906) 
0.254*** 
(0.0645) 
0.0642 
(0.0841) 
Non-White 0.0202 (0.114) 
-0.0288 
(0.0784) 
0.148 
(0.102) 
Family Income 0.848*** (0.262) 
0.838*** 
(0.192) 
0.917*** 
(0.240) 
Education 0.0511 (0.180) 
0.457*** 
(0.137) 
0.0906 
(0.173) 
Homeowner 0.367*** (0.0985) 
0.359*** 
(0.0683) 
0.315*** 
(0.0941) 
Married -0.0145 (0.0941) 
0.00476 
(0.0671) 
-0.0595 
(0.0892) 
Church  
Attendance 
0.379*** 
(0.138) 
0.469*** 
(0.101) 
0.419*** 
(0.126) 
Strong 
Partisanship 
0.378** 
(0.166) 
0.527*** 
(0.143) 
0.363** 
(0.163) 
Campaign 
Contact 
0.452*** 
(0.0983) 
0.902*** 
(0.0650) 
0.450*** 
(0.0924) 
Political 
Interest 
1.351*** 
(0.146) 
1.170*** 
(0.107) 
1.316*** 
(0.146) 
Political 
Knowledge 
1.440*** 
(0.166) 
2.069*** 
(0.119) 
1.364*** 
(0.168) 
Political 
Activity 
1.582*** 
(0.283) 
1.683*** 
(0.238) 
1.678*** 
(0.263) 
Constant -2.658*** (0.175) 
-1.944*** 
(0.116) 
-2.604*** 
(0.163) 
Observations 7,331 34,270 34,270 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.5 Self-Reported vs. Validated Turnout Models, 2014 CCES 
2014 CCES Self-Reported Turnout Validated Turnout 
Age 1.671*** (0.133) 
2.270*** 
(0.103) 
Female -0.246*** (0.0506) 
0.00916 
(0.0368) 
Non-White -0.179*** (0.0568) 
-0.397*** 
(0.0454) 
Family Income 0.404*** (0.131) 
-0.0954 
(0.0972) 
Education 0.843*** (0.0942) 
0.664*** 
(0.0685) 
Homeowner 0.361*** (0.0531) 
0.0535 
(0.0428) 
Church Attendance 0.195*** (0.0708) 
-0.0457 
(0.0535) 
Strong Partisanship 0.569*** (0.103) 
0.0885 
(0.0603) 
Campaign Contact 0.560*** (0.0485) 
0.481*** 
(0.0364) 
Political Interest 1.123*** (0.0835) 
0.447*** 
(0.0756) 
Political Knowledge 1.795*** (0.0906) 
1.575*** 
(0.0797) 
Constant -1.601*** (0.1000) 
-2.386*** 
(0.0845) 
Observations 37,969 37,969 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.6 Self-Reported vs. Validated Turnout Models, 2012 CCES 
2012 Self-reported Turnout Validated Turnout 
Age 0.745*** (0.208) 
1.231*** 
(0.116) 
Female 0.113 (0.0816) 
0.190*** 
(0.0425) 
Non-White 0.0545 (0.102) 
-0.204*** 
(0.0515) 
Family Income 1.180*** (0.225) 
-0.151 
(0.113) 
Education 0.688*** (0.182) 
0.293*** 
(0.0809) 
Homeowner 0.279*** (0.0907) 
0.123** 
(0.0491) 
Church Attendance 0.209* (0.125) 
0.124** 
(0.0628) 
Strong Partisanship 0.388** (0.184) 
0.0550 
(0.0662) 
Campaign Contact 0.562*** (0.0855) 
0.378*** 
(0.0464) 
Political Interest 1.030*** (0.142) 
0.339*** 
(0.0837) 
Political Knowledge 1.873*** (0.155) 
0.843*** 
(0.0891) 
Constant -0.197 (0.137) 
-0.794*** 
(0.0876) 
Observations 36,396 36,396 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.7 Self-Reported Turnout by BIDR Scales, 2016 CCES UMass Module 
2016 Self-Reported Turnout 
SD Scale 0.926** (0.437) 
IM Scale -0.131 (0.311) 
Constant 1.071*** (0.267) 
Observations 2,758 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.8 Self-Reported Turnout by BIDR Scales with Controls, 
2016 CCES UMass Module 
2016 Self-Reported Turnout 
SD Scale 0.195 (0.497) 
IM Scale 0.140 (0.362) 
Age 0.131 (0.446) 
Female 0.0511 (0.193) 
Non-White -0.554** (0.217) 
Family Income 1.417*** (0.508) 
Education 1.423*** (0.380) 
Homeowner 0.467** (0.197) 
Strong Partisanship 1.170*** (0.304) 
Campaign Contact 1.196*** (0.203) 
Political Knowledge 2.010*** (0.277) 
Constant -1.596*** (0.390) 
Observations 2,483 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C 
ALTERNATE RESPONSE LATENCY ANALYSIS: INCLUDING NON MATCHED 
RESPONDENTS & UNIFORM TRIMMING ACROSS SURVEY YEARS 
 In this appendix I present results for the OLS models predicting vote self-report 
response latencies by overreporting with a less restrictive subset of respondents, and with 
a uniform cut point for trimming the vote self-report response latencies in both the 2012 
and 2014 CCES. The results presented here constitute robustness checks on the model 
presented in this body of the dissertation, in order to test whether significant findings 
presented still hold under alternative specifications. 
 The first robustness check addresses the analysis in Chapter 4, which only included 
respondents who were matched to the Catalist voter file by using a more inclusive model. 
Not matched respondents are persons for which Catalist found no record and can be 
interpreted as nonvoters; however, there is some likelihood that a non trivial amount of 
not matched respondents could be actual voters. This means that nonvoters in the CCES 
can be defined in two ways, first as matched respondents with no record of turnout and 
second as any respondent with no record of voting or registration, which includes not 
matched respondents. The first definition of who nonvoters are was used in the chapter 
because it provides the most precise identification of nonvoters within the CCES. Here I 
use the second and looser definition of nonvoters still finding a significant effect of 
overreporting on increasing the length of response latencies for the vote self-report 
question. 
 The CCES includes a dichotomous variable named “matched” that identifies all 
respondents who were matched by Catalist to a record, being matched to a record is not 
predicated on being registered to vote. Independent download of the 2014 CCES dataset 
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and tabulation of the “matched” variable will corroborate the 30% rate of not matched 
respondents. The CCES sample has almost consistently grown in each of its iterations 
since 2008. In 2014 the CCES was at its largest and had the largest rate of not matched 
respondents of any CCES survey conducted since 2008 (See Table C.1). Still, Catalist 
uses a proprietary algorithm for matching, they purchase new records multiple times a 
year, continuously update their records, and clean and standardize their data 
(Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2010). Catalist’s data management and customized proprietary 
algorithm has resulted in high rates of matches with high levels of certainty.  
Table C.1 CCES Respondents by Catalist Match Status 
CCES Survey Year Total Respondents Matched to Catalist Not Matched 
2014 56,200 100% 
39,415 
70% 
16,785 
30% 
2012 54,535 100% 
43,342 
80% 
11,193 
20% 
2010  55,405 100% 
42,916 
78% 
12,489 
22% 
2008 32,795 100% 
27,444 
84% 
5,351 
16% 
Rows present weighted total and percent of CCES respondents matched and not matched to the Catalist 
voter file. 
 
 The 2012 CCES had a total 54,535 respondents and 80% (43,342) of these 
respondents were matched to the Catalist voter file, while the 2014 CCES had 56,200 
respondents 70% (39,415) were matched, the remaining 20% and 30% are not matched 
(See Table C.1). The not matched respondents will be considered nonvoters in this 
alternate analysis. The subset of respondents included in the analysis excludes 
respondents for the state of Virginia because voting records are not available for public 
use. Also, only respondents who reported that they “definitely voted in the General 
Election” are used to compare response latencies of honest voters and over-reporters. A 
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total 38,377 respondents in the 2012 CCES reported that they went out to vote and 75% 
of those self-reported voters are validated voters. Under the new definition of nonvoters 
in this appendix 25% of the respondents in the analysis are classified as over-reporters. 
There are a total 37,722 respondents in the 2014 CCES who are self-reported voters, but 
only 68% to them are validated voters. With the inclusion of not matched respondents the 
rate of overreporting in 2014 is of 32% (See Table C.2) 
Table C.2 CCES Self Reported Voters by Validation Status 
CCES Total Reported Turnout Validated Voters 
Over-reporters 
(Nonvoters) 
2012 38,377 100% 
28,852 
75% 
9,525 
25% 
2014 37,722 100% 
25,739 
68% 
11,984 
32%% 
Weighted total and percentage of 2014 CCES respondents who reported they “definitely voted” in the 
2014 General Election by vote validation status.  
 
 Table C.3 shows descriptive statistics for the baseline and vote self-report page 
timings after trimming. The quantities differ only slightly from those in the paper paper 
because of the inclusion of not matched respondents in this alternate analysis.  
Table C.3 CCES Vote Self-Report, Placebo and Baseline Page Timings 
CCES Vote Self-Report Timing Baseline Timing 
2012 
Mean 9.249s 6.748s 
Min. 0.579s 2.045s 
Max. 24.954s 15.488s 
2014 
Mean 9.715s 6.866s 
Min. 0.292s 1.471s 
Max. 29.531s 17.756s 
Weighted mean for three (3) page timing measures: vote self-report timing, party identification timing, 
and baseline timing in the 2012 and 2014 CCES for respondents who said they “definitely voted in 2012 
and 2014. Baseline is the calculated average timing from items presented in Table 2. 
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Table C.4 2012 CCES OLS Models Matched vs. Not Matched, Standard Trimming 
2012 CCES Excludes Not Matched  
Respondents 
Includes Not Matched  
Respondents 
Overreporting 0.325*** (0.118) 
0.154** 
(0.0754) 
Week of Admin. 0.0177 (0.0362) 
0.00625 
(0.0337) 
Baseline Response Timing 1.037*** (0.0198) 
1.048*** 
(0.0184) 
Constant 1.909*** (0.143) 
1.871*** 
(0.131) 
Observations 26,737 30,669 
R-squared 0.320 0.319 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 OLS regression models for the effect of overreporting on the vote self-report 
response latencies show statistically significant results with the same direction as in the 
more restrictive sample models presented in the paper. The level of significance is lower 
for the 2012 model, but overreporting continues to be the driving force for increased 
cognitive effort in responding to the vote self-report question. Results differ in the 
magnitude of the effect, with a change from an effect of 0.325s to an effect of 0.154s in 
the 2012 model that includes not matched respondents (See Table C.4). While 
overreporting also continued to have significant effect of increasing response latencies 
for the 2014 vote self-report question the size of the effect was much smaller when not 
match respondents were included in the analysis with an increase increase of 0.471s, 
almost five tenths of a second (See Tables C.5). 
 Thought the magnitude of the effect of overreporting is smaller among the models 
conducted with these less restrictive sample subsets it is clear that falsely reporting 
participation in elections significantly increases the length of response latencies for the 
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turnout self-report no matter how the subset under analysis is defined. The main 
conclusion stays the same, overreporting turnout requires greater cognitive effort than 
honest reports. This evidence continues to support the assumption the overreports are the 
result of deception and in the form of socially desirable responding. 
Table C.5 2014 CCES OLS Models Matched vs. Not Matched, Standard Trimming 
2014 CCES Excludes Not Matched  
Respondents 
Includes Not Matched  
Respondents 
Overreporting 0.733*** (0.121) 
0.471*** 
(0.0747) 
Week of Admin. 0.102*** (0.0343) 
0.113*** 
(0.0334) 
Baseline Response Timing 0.979*** (0.0199) 
0.998*** 
(0.0185) 
Constant 2.302*** (0.154) 
2.181*** 
(0.143) 
Observations 21,320 28,188 
R-squared 0.266 0.256 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The second robustness check addresses trimming of the dependent variable, namely 
the response latency for the vote self-report question. In Chapter 4 of this dissertation I 
use the value at the 95th percentile as the trimming point to eliminate extreme values for 
the response latency measure. However, because the vote self-report question retains the 
same question wording and questionnaire placement in the CCES post election survey 
one could select a non arbitrary trimming point. I use the rounded maximum value for the 
time it takes to answer this question in the 2012 CCES found in Table C.3, 25s, as the 
trimming point for the dependent variable in both survey years. I use this alternate 
trimming for models that exclude not matched respondents and models that include them 
in the subset under analysis.  
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Table C.6 2012 CCES Vote Self-Report Response Timing Trimmed at 25s 
2012 CCES Excludes Not Matched  Respondents 
Includes Not Matched  
Respondents 
Overreport 0.168*** (0.0582) 
0.162*** 
(0.0584) 
Baseline timing 1.043*** (0.0197) 
1.042*** 
(0.0197) 
Week of Admin. 0.00198 (0.0355) 
0.00221 
(0.0355) 
Constant 1.896*** (0.141) 
1.903*** 
(0.141) 
Observations 27,532 27,533 
R-squared 0.320 0.319 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
	
 The models with a 25s cut off point for trimming the dependent variable continue to 
hold the same statistically significant relationship between overreporting and lengthier 
response latencies controlling for baseline timing and week of self-administration of the 
post election survey (see Tables C.6 & C.7). OLS regression results for 2012 with the 25s 
trimming point have almost identical coefficients for the effect of overreporting on the 
vote self-report response timing when not matched respondents are included or excluded 
from analysis. This is not the case for 2014 where the coefficient for the model including 
not matched respondents with the 25s trimming point is somewhat lower than the size of 
the effect of overreporting when not matched respondents were excluded. 
 Finally, the robustness checks presented in this appendix show that the results in the 
body of the dissertation hold under alternative specifications. These consistent finding 
that overreporting has positive and significant relationship with lengthier response 
latencies for the vote self-report question allows me to say with confidence that 
overreporting requires more cognitive effort than honestly reporting participation. 
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Table C.7 2014 CCES Vote Self-Report Response Timing Trimmed at 25s 
2014 CCES Excludes Not Matched  Respondents 
Includes Not Matched  
Respondents 
Overreport 0.337*** (0.120) 
0.218*** 
(0.0697) 
Baseline Timing 0.766*** (0.0171) 
0.764*** 
(0.0154) 
Week of Admin. 0.0554* (0.0323) 
0.0589** 
(0.0299) 
Constant 3.615*** (0.137) 
3.622*** 
(0.126) 
Observations 25,057 33,096 
R-squared 0.247 0.239 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
APPENDIX D 
BIDR SCALE PILOT STUDY 
One of the goals of this dissertation is to gather evidence to either support or 
reject the assumption that turnout overreports in survey research are the result of socially 
desirable responding. Social psychologist Delroy L.Paulhus developed a battery of 40 
questions meant to detect social desirability, named the Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding (BIDR), which has been reduced to 16 items (Hart.et al., 2015) The BIDR 
includes a Self-Deception Scale and an Impression Management Scale in order to 
measure a person's tendency to either give self-deceptive or other-deceptive responses. 
The main difference between these two forms of socially desirable responding is intent, 
in the first the respondents are unconsciously deceptive and in the second they are 
intentionally deceptive.  
This pilot study allowed for the selection of a small set of items for the 16 item 
BIDR, six to be exact,for inclusions in the 2016 CCES UMass Module. Including items 
from each scale within the BIDR in the UMass CCES Modules allowed meto carry out 
correlational analysis that might help determine whether respondents who falsely report 
participation in the 2016 General Election did so intentionally or not. 
Pilot Study 
Prof. Brian F. Schaffner and I conducted a pilot study from June 8th to June 12th. 
The study was a post- election online survey that included 15 of the questions in the 16 
item BIDR and was completed by 499 respondents. Recruitment was conducted through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) where MTurk workers were offered a small 
monetary compensation for completion of a short questionnaire regarding current primary 
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politics. Only California residents where allowed to complete the online survey hosted on 
Qualtrics.  
Figure 1 
IRT Item Information Function Graphs for Self-Deception Scale 
 
 
Here I present factor analysis of the Self-Deception Scale and Impression 
Management Scale through which I have selected six items to include in the UMass 
CCES Module. First, I use IRT modeling for ordinal responses to determine which of 8 
items measuring respondents' tendency to give self-deceptive answers are most effective 
at measuring the latent variable and provide the most coverage. "Item information 
function" (IIF) plots were central to the process of elimination of the least effective 
questionnaire items along with IRT modeling outputs. Subfigure (a) of Figure 1 shows all 
items in the Self-Deception Scale, clearly on item is more effective than all other items at 
(a) Full SD Scale
(c) 3 Item SD Scale
(b) 4 Item SD Scale
(c) 2 Item SD Scale
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providing the most information about a person's tendency to be self-deceptive. Subfigures 
(b), (c) and (d) are IIF plots of the IRT models that were used to create reduced latent 
variables that were compared to the full Self-Deception Scale. The same process was 
applied to the factor analysis of the Impression Management Scale (See Figure 2 for IRT 
IIF plots). 
Figure 2 
IRT Item Information Function Graphs for Self-Deception Scale 
 
 
The three reduced Self-Deception Scales were compared to the full scale and so 
too were three reduced Impression Management Scales compared to its full 
corresponding scale. Scaterrplots in Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the effectiveness of each 
reduced scale when compared with their corresponding full scales. Correlation between 
the four item Self-Deception Scale and the full scale was very high (0.9198). Though 
(c) 3 Item IM Scale
(a) Full IM Scale (b) 4 Item IM Scale
(c) 2 Item IM Scale
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correlation between the 3 item scale (0.8976) and 2 item scale (0.8651) with the full Self-
Deception Scale decreased, correlation remained high enough for me to be confident that 
the 3 or 2 item scales wouldl be effective at measuring the latent variable. At the same 
time correlation between the 4 item Impression Management Scale and the full scale was 
exceptionally high (0.9501). A reduction is evident in the correlations between the full 
Impression Management Scale, 3 item scale (0.8895) and 2 item scale (0.8664), but still 
the 3 or 2 item scale should be sufficient to gauge a person's tendency to impression 
managing responses. Chapter 5 lists the questionnaires items used in the 2016 CCES 
UMass Module. 
 
Figure 3 
Scatterplots for Self-Deception Scale Latent Variables 
 
 
 
(a) Full SD Scale by 4 Item SD Scale
(b) Full SD Scale by 3 Item SD Scale (c) Full SD Scale by 2 Item SD Scale
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Figure 4 
Scatterplots for Impression Management Scale Latent Variables 
 
 
 
(a) Full IM Scale by 4 Item IM Scale
(b) Full IM Scale by 3 Item IM Scale (c) Full IM Scale by 2 Item IM Scale
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